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State Regulation of Policing: POST
Commissions and Police Accountability
Hilary Rau,* Kim Shayo Buchanan,** Monique L. Dixon,*** & Phillip
Atiba Goff****
This Article examines the untapped potential of Peace Officer Standards and
Training (POST) commissions to protect communities that experience police misconduct
and discrimination. POST commissions, which are created by state laws and exist in all
fifty states, have broad authority to regulate police officers and police departments. POST
commissions determine eligibility and qualifications for police employment and regulate the
content of training officers receive. Most POST commissions can also revoke certification of
officers who commit serious misconduct or fail to meet continuing eligibility requirements set
by the commissions. In some states, they can also impose statewide, compulsory reforms to
policing policy.
POST commissions have yet to fulfill their potential to protect the public from harmful
police behaviors because (1) they lack clear legislative or organizational mandates to protect
the public against unethical or unjust policing and (2) their membership tends to be
dominated by law enforcement officials with little or no input from the communities that are
most burdened by aggressive and discriminatory policing. If legislatures address these
structural problems, POST commissions could regulate policing to protect communities from
police abuse and misconduct.

* Policy Director, Center for Policing Equity.
** Senior Policy Scholar, Center for Policing Equity.
*** Former Director of State Advocacy and Senior Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc.
**** Carl I. Hovland Professor of African-American Studies and Professor of Psychology, Yale
University; Co-founder and CEO, Center for Policing Equity.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 25, 2020, Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin murdered
George Floyd, an unarmed Black man, by pressing his knee into Floyd’s neck for
over nine minutes. Chauvin was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced
to twenty-two and one-half years in prison.1 Three other former Minneapolis police
officers face pending charges for aiding and abetting the murder: two trainees
reportedly held Floyd down, while a third officer prevented onlookers from
intervening.2 The murder of George Floyd, which prompted outrage and protests
across the United States, illustrates profound systemic failures in current public
safety regulation. Why was Chauvin, who had eighteen prior complaints against him
and had been involved in two prior shootings, still patrolling the streets of
Minneapolis and training new officers?3 How could two new officers have emerged
from the police academy without grasping their duty to intervene and protect

1. Tim Arango, Derek Chauvin is sentenced to 22 and a half years for murder of George Floyd, ( Jun. 25,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/25/us/derek-chauvin-22-and-a-half-years-georgefloyd.html [ https://perma.cc/QB5P-RSTC ]; What We Know About the Death of George Floyd in
Minneapolis, N.Y. TIMES ( Jan. 12, 2021, 10:57 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/article/georgefloyd.html
[ https://web.archive.org/web/20210112170156/http://www.nytimes.com/article/
george-floyd.html ]; Kim Barker, The Black Officer Who Detained George Floyd Had Pledged to Fix the
Police, N.Y. TIMES ( Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/27/us/minneapolis-policeofficer-kueng.html [ https://perma.cc/CA4N-YQEB ]; Chao Xiong, Former Officer Who Held Back
Crowd at George Floyd Death Should Face Trial, Prosecutors Argue, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 24, 2020, 8:32 PM),
https://www.startribune.com/former-officer-who-held-back-crowd-at-george-floyd-death-shouldface-trial-prosecutors-argue/572210692/ [ https://perma.cc/5SLT-UU4N ].
2. Cassidy MacDonald, After Derek Chauvin's guilty verdict, 3 other Minneapolis police officers await
trial , CBS NEWS (May 21, 2021, 12:08 PM); https://www.cbsnews.com/news/derek-chauvin-verdictminneapolis-officers-trial/; What We Know About the Death of George Floyd in Minneapolis, supra note
1; Barker, supra note 1; Xiong, supra note 1.
3. Barker, supra note 1.
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Floyd?4 Why did the Minneapolis Police Department allow the use of chokeholds5
when many other departments had banned them decades before?6
The police killings of George Floyd and of Breonna Taylor have brought new
momentum to the long struggle for a systemic reconstruction of public safety in the
United States.7 While some recent public safety reform proposals have focused on
federal interventions,8 most public safety policymaking occurs at the state or local
level.9 Systemic reconstruction of public safety will, therefore, require
state-level intervention.
Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) commissions are the statewide
regulatory bodies that govern local law enforcement agencies.10 POST
4. Id.; Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557, 565 (8th Cir. 2009) (“As of July 2006, it was clearly
established that a state actor may be liable for an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment
if he fails to intervene to prevent the unconstitutional use of excessive force by another official.”); see
also Bell v. Kan. City Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 346, 347 (8th Cir. 2011).
5. Jennifer Mayerle, Minneapolis Agrees to Ban Chokeholds & Require Officers to Intervene
Against Unauthorized Use of Force, CBS MINN. ( June 5, 2020, 4:10 PM), https://
minnesota.cbslocal.com/2020/06/05/after-george-floyds-death-minneapolis-bans-chokeholds-bypolice/ [ https://perma.cc/3M92-7UHM ].
6. Larry Altman, Chokeholds Have Been Banned in Los Angeles for Decades, DAILY BREEZE
(Dec. 4, 2014, 9:27 PM), https://www.dailybreeze.com/2014/12/04/chokeholds-have-been-bannedin-los-angeles-for-decades/ [ https://perma.cc/NCS9-V2JK ]; Nolan Hicks, City Council Approves
Chokehold Ban, Other NYPD Reforms amid Budget Fight, N.Y. POST: METRO ( June 18, 2020, 5:43 PM),
https://nypost.com/2020/06/18/city-council-approves-chokehold-ban-and-nypd-reforms/ [ https://
perma.cc/NNT6-568A ]; Mario Orellana, Union Says HPD Has Not Used Chokehold in Decades After
Mayor Turner Issues Ban, CLICK2HOUS. ( June 9, 2020, 9:54 P.M.), https://www.click2houston.com/
news/local/2020/06/10/union-says-hpd-has-not-used-chokehold-in-decades-after-mayor-turnerissues-ban/ [ https://web.archive.org/web/20200803155554/https://www.click2houston.com/
news/local/2020/06/10/union-says-hpd-has-not-used-chokehold-in-decades-after-mayor-turnerissues-ban/ ].
7. Brakkton Booker, Breonna Taylor’s Mother Urges Criminal Charges: ‘Every Day Is Still March
the 13th,’ NPR (Aug. 13, 2020, 2:30 P.M.), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-forracial-justice/2020/08/13/902104185/breonna-taylors-mother-awaits-criminal-charges-every-day-isstill-march-the-13th [ https://perma.cc/G5BL-LBW9 ]. Since 2015, Black residents disproportionately
have been killed by police nationwide: twenty-four percent of people fatally shot by police are Black,
even though Black people represent only thirteen percent of the general population. See 964 People
Have Been Shot and Killed by Police in the Past Year, WASH. POST: FATAL FORCE, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/ [ https://perma.cc/
LWD2-DHR5 ] (last updated July 2, 2021).
8. The U.S. House of Representatives debated and passed a bill—the George Floyd Justice in
Policing Act of 2020—that would have ended qualified immunity for law enforcement officers accused
of misconduct, banned chokeholds, and incentivized departments to adopt stricter use-of-force
policies. See George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. (2020). In 2021, the
bill was again passed by the House, but has not yet been voted on by the Senate. George Floyd Justice
in Policing Act of 2021, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. (2021).
9. Sarah A. Seo & Daniel Richman, Police Reform Won’t Work Unless It Involves Federal and
State Governments, WASH. POST: MADE BY HISTORY ( July 7, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/07/police-reform-wont-work-unless-it-involves-federal
-state-governments/ [ https://perma.cc/ZF9C-U8YV ].
10. See, e.g., About POST, CA.GOV: POST COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS
& TRAINING, https://post.ca.gov/About-Us [ https://perma.cc/Y45V-A353 ] (last visited
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commissions11 exist in all fifty states12 and in the District of Columbia.13 They
determine eligibility and qualifications for police employment14 and coordinate
police training programs, including the police academies that all newly hired officers
must attend.15 Most POST commissions can revoke the certification of officers
who commit serious misconduct or fail to meet continuing eligibility requirements
set by the commission.16 In some states, they also create policy standards that all
departments must meet or exceed.17
POST commissions have unique power to protect communities against
unethical, discriminatory, or abusive policing. Within each state, POST
commissions regulate almost every police officer18 and agency, from small-town
sheriffs’ departments to major metropolitan agencies with thousands of officers
who serve millions of people.19 Thus, POST commissions have power to impose
changes that will affect thousands of officers statewide, including officers employed
by police and sheriffs’ departments that may lack the resources or inclination to
implement best practices, may lack civilian oversight,20 and may not attract attention
from the U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ).21

July 17, 2021).
11. In some states, the police certification body is known by a different name. In Florida, for
example, the body that certifies police officers is the Criminal Justice Standards and Training
Commission. In Alaska, it is the Police Standards Council. For purposes of this paper, state agencies
that regulate police standards and training are referred to, collectively, as “POST commissions.”
12. Hawaii was the last state to create a POST commission in 2018. Hawaii’s Police Standards
Board has not yet finalized its training and certification standards as required by statute. See Gina
Mangieri, Hawaii Law Enforcement Standards Board Behind as Nation Turns Focus on Policing, KHON2
( June 3, 2020, 10:39 AM), https://www.khon2.com/news/always-investigating/hawaii-lawenforcement-standards-board-behind-as-nation-turns-focus-on-policing/ [ https://perma.cc/7JC8-4CD9].
13. DC POST Board (Police Officers Standards and Training Board), DC.GOV: METRO. POLICE
DEP’T, https://mpdc.dc.gov/page/dc-post-board-police-officers-standards-and-training-board [ https://
perma.cc/WE3T-Y5YB ] (last visited July 17, 2021).
14. See infra Section III.B.
15. See infra Section III.B.1.
16. See infra Section III.C.
17. See infra Section III.B.2.
18. Some POST commissions also regulate who can work as a correctional officer, reserve
officer, or private security officer. See MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, POST AGENCY CERTIFICATION
PRACTICES, 2015 (2016).
19. While regulation by POST commissions is the rule, there are rare exceptions. For example,
California’s POST program is a voluntary, incentive-based program. While the vast majority of
departments in California participate, there are a handful of smaller departments that are not
POST-participating. Most non-participating agencies are affiliated with schools, universities, district
attorney offices, and probation departments. See California Law Enforcement Agencies,
CA.GOV: COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING, https://post.ca.gov/le-agencies
[ https://perma.cc/6QW6-WYSU ] (last visited July 17, 2021).
20. Police Oversight by Jurisdiction (USA), NAT’L ASS’N FOR CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF
L. ENF’T, https://www.nacole.org/police_oversight_by_jurisdiction_usa [ https://perma.cc/BKM4YQ83 ](last visited July 17, 2021).
21. C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S PATTERN AND PRACTICE
POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994-PRESENT 41–48 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/922421/
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POST commissions can regulate policing proactively and can hold abusive
officers accountable. Most mechanisms for police accountability can address police
misconduct only after a civil rights violation occurs; they have limited power to
change law enforcement policies that are ineffective or unjust. For example, the
USDOJ Civil Rights Division can mandate policy changes only if a law enforcement
agency has engaged in a pattern or practice of constitutional violations.22 Similarly,
because Supreme Court precedent sets an extraordinarily high bar for civil litigants
who seek injunctive relief to prevent future acts of police misconduct,23 plaintiffs
are typically limited to seeking compensatory damages for harms that have already
occurred.24 Local civilian oversight agencies rarely possess the authority to compel
changes to police policy or training.25 POST commissions, by contrast, can impose
training requirements, policy standards, and hiring criteria that could prevent harm
and misconduct before they occur.
POST commissions have been largely overlooked in legal academic literature
about accountability and racial justice in policing. This literature has tended to focus
on the protections afforded by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and by federal civil rights statutes.26 Yet, as many scholars have
download [ https://perma.cc/NPE4-MX4G ]. Under the Trump administration, the USDOJ mostly
retreated from pattern or practice litigation and from civil rights reform collaboration with law
enforcement agencies, although President Biden has pledged to reinvigorate the DOJ Civil Rights
Division. See Stephen Rushin, Police Reform During the Trump Administration, 2017
U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE: TRUMP 100 DAYS (Apr. 29, 2017), https://www.illinoislawreview.org/
symposium/first-100-days/police-reform-during-the-trump-administration/
[ https://perma.cc/
KDL5-2W9G ]; Carrie Johnson, Advocates Push for Resurrection of DOJ Civil Rights Division Under
Biden, NPR (Nov. 29, 2020, 12:54 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/29/938948927/advocatespush-for-resurrection-of-doj-civil-rights-division-under-biden
[ https://perma.cc/KWV5-DZ54 ];
Ayanna Alexander, Biden DOJ Pick Aims to Revitalize Civil Rights Office Post-Trump (1), BLOOMBERG
L. (Feb. 19, 2021, 8:23 AM) https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/biden-doj-pick-aims-torevitalize-civil-rights-office-post-trump [ https://perma.cc/RL6Q-TEKX ].
22. 34 U.S.C. § 12601.
23. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 97–98, 111 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff who had been subjected to a chokehold by LAPD officers lacked standing to seek
injunctive relief. Although the plaintiff introduced evidence that LAPD officers had killed sixteen
people with chokeholds over a nine-year period (including twelve African-Americans), the Court held
that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he personally faced an immediate threat of being subjected to
a chokehold in the future. Id. at 111.
24. Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437, 450–51 (2016)
(“The Supreme Court’s standing doctrine makes it difficult for a plaintiff to bring claims for injunctive
relief against law enforcement; accordingly, plaintiffs rely primarily on damages actions.”).
25. JOSEPH DE ANGELIS, RICHARD ROSENTHAL & BRIAN BUCHNER, CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF VARIOUS MODELS
11
(2016),
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/nacole/pages/161/attachments/original/
1481727977/NACOLE_short_doc_FINAL.pdf?1481727977 [ https://perma.cc/A5XV-GEVJ ].
26. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 782 (2012) (“Since the
Warren Court, academics have largely confined their analysis of the problem of policing in law to
constitutional analysis of police conduct that falls within the plausible scope of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.”); Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179,
2182 (2014).

Clean Final Edit_Rau Buchanan Dixon Goff.docx (Do Not Delete)

1354

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

8/19/21 2:58 PM

[Vol. 11:1349

noted, constitutional litigation has not offered reliable protection against
discriminatory policing, excessive force, or other forms of police misconduct.27
More recently, legal scholars have begun to explore a broader ecology of police
regulation.28 They have analyzed and proposed revisions to the matrix of state,
federal, and local laws and contracts that directly and indirectly regulate policing.29
They have also examined a wide array of government and private actors whose
decisions can shape police policy, culture, and behavior.30 But the scholarly literature

27. See, e.g., Megan Quattlebaum, Let’s Get Real: Behavioral Realism, Implicit Bias, and the
Reasonable Police Officer, 14 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 24 (2018); I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth
Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 34 (2011)
(arguing that current Fourth Amendment case law “virtually gives officers carte blanche to engage in
race-based pretextual stops”); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the
Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 328 (1997); Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It
Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1452 (2016); Alice Ristroph,
The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182, 1219–20 (2017); Tonja Jacobi, The Law and
Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 587 (2011) (arguing that the
exclusionary rule does not effectively deter police officers from conducting searches that violate the
Fourth Amendment); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 26 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“By
sanctioning a ‘shoot first, think later’ approach to policing, the Court renders the protections of the
Fourth Amendment hollow.”); Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s “one-sided approach to qualified immunity transforms
the doctrine into an absolute shield for law enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent effect of the
Fourth Amendment”).
28. Harmon, supra note 26, at 786.
29. See, e.g., id. at 790–92; Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 767–77 (2017); Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy
for Police Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 479,
481–82 (2009); Stoughton, supra note 26, at 2183–84; Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE
L.J. 1191, 1239 (2017); Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force: De-escalation,
Preseizure Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 661 (2018); Myriam
E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil
Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1417–19 (2000); Maria Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police Rulemaking,
114 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2019).
30. See, e.g., Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99
MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1348 (2015) (USDOJ Civil Rights Division); Walker & Macdonald, supra note 29,
at 481–82 (state attorneys general and state legislatures); I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and
Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 875–76 (2008) (local prosecutors); Rushin, supra note 29, at 1239 (police
unions and civil service commissions); Merrick Bobb, Civilian Oversight of the Police in the United States,
22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 151, 159 (2003) (civilian oversight bodies); Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths
and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 1023, 1082 (2010) (public entity insurers); John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public
Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539 (2017) (public entity insurers); Ingrid V. Eagly & Joanna C. Schwartz,
Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking, 96 TEX. L. REV. 891, 891 (2018) (private police
policymaking companies); Karena Rahall, The Green to Blue Pipeline: Defense Contractors and the Police
Industrial Complex, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1785, 1785 (2015) (defense contractors); Jocelyn Simonson,
Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 391 (2016) (citizen copwatching groups); Barbara E. Armacost,
Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 457 (2004) (internal
organizational culture); Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 611 (2016) (same); Samuel Walker, “Not Dead Yet”: The National Police Crisis,
a New Conversation About Policing, and the Prospects for Accountability-Related Police Reform, 2018
U. ILL. L. REV. 1777, 1792–99 (police industry groups like the Police Executive Research Forum).
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on police regulation has largely overlooked POST commissions.31 Although a few
scholars have argued for expansion or increased utilization of POST power to
regulate pre-employment background checks32 and decertify officers who commit
misconduct,33 legal scholars have yet to systematically address how POST
commissions could be constructed to protect the public against discriminatory,
unethical, or violent policing.34
This Article aims to fill this gap by proposing fundamental changes to POST
commissions’ structure, mandate, and membership, so that POST commissions can
realize their potential to protect communities against violent, discriminatory, and
unethical policing. In Part I, we contend that the legislative and institutional
mandate of each POST commission must state that a primary goal of its regulatory
and enforcement powers is to protect people against incompetent, abusive, or
discriminatory policing, as other professional regulatory bodies do.35 Part II argues
that POST commissions, which are typically dominated by law enforcement
officials, should include substantial representation of the public, especially
representatives of Black, Native, Latinx, and other communities that experience
burdensome or discriminatory policing. Part III recommends rules that POST
commissions might adopt to better protect the public from incompetent or
abusive policing.
I. A PUBLIC INTEREST MANDATE
Reconstruction of POST commissions must begin with a redefinition of their
mission and purpose. POST commissions should commit to protecting people from
harm by members of the profession, as other statewide professional governance

31. Even articles that aim to provide an overview of policing reform strategies have not
addressed POST commissions as vehicles for reform. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 24 (comparing nine
categories of individuals and entities with the potential to promote police accountability and reform);
Walker, supra note 30 (discussing a broad series of police reform efforts at the national, state, and local
levels after the events in Ferguson in 2014).
32. Ben Grunwald & John Rappaport, The Wandering Officer, 129 YALE L. J. 1676,
1695–96 (2020).
33. Roger Goldman & Steven Puro, Decertification of Police: An Alternative to Traditional
Remedies for Police Misconduct, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 45, 48–50 (1987) [ hereinafter Goldman
& Puro (1987) ]; Roger L. Goldman & Steven Puro, Revocation of Police Officer Certification: A Viable
Remedy for Police Misconduct?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 541, 542–44 (2001) [ hereinafter Goldman & Puro
(2001) ]; Roger L. Goldman, State Revocation of Law Enforcement Officers’ Licenses and Federal Criminal
Prosecution: An Opportunity for Cooperative Federalism, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 121, 121 (2003)
[ hereinafter Goldman (2003) ]; Roger L. Goldman, A Model Decertification Law, 32 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 147, 149 (2012) [ hereinafter Goldman (2012) ].
34. As Rachel Harmon has observed, “little has been written about how [POST commissions]
should be organized to avoid undue influence by the police officers and departments they regulate,
what their powers can usefully be, or how their regulations interact with other means of promoting
lawful and harm-efficient policing.” Harmon, supra note 26, at 806.
35. State governing bodies in other professions, such as nursing, medicine, and law, typically do
have legislative mandates to protect the public. See infra Part I.

Clean Final Edit_Rau Buchanan Dixon Goff.docx (Do Not Delete)

1356

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

8/19/21 2:58 PM

[Vol. 11:1349

bodies do. For example, California’s Medical Practice Act states: “Protection of the
public shall be the highest priority for the Medical Board of California in exercising
its licensing, regulatory, and disciplinary functions. Whenever the protection of the
public is inconsistent with other interests sought to be promoted, the protection of
the public shall be paramount.”36 Near-identical language is included in the
authorizing statutes of California’s governing bodies for the professions of
nursing,37 psychology,38 law,39 cosmetology,40 and general contractors.41 Yet the
authorizing statute for California’s POST commission is silent about protecting the
public against harm by police.42 Instead, it states only that the commission’s power
to set minimum selection standards for officers should be exercised “[f]or the
purpose of raising the level of competence of local law enforcement officers.”43
The absence of a public-protection mandate is typical of most
POST-authorizing statutes. When state statutes identify any purpose for the POST,
they usually emphasize that police training should be “of a professional quality” in
order to protect public safety and the administration of criminal justice.44 Only three

36. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2001.1
37. Id. § 2708.1 (“Protection of the public shall be the highest priority for the Board of
Registered Nursing in exercising its licensing, regulatory, and disciplinary functions. Whenever the
protection of the public is inconsistent with other interests sought to be promoted, the protection of
the public shall be paramount.”)
38. Id. § 4990.16 (“Protection of the public shall be the highest priority for the board in
exercising its licensing, regulatory, and disciplinary functions. Whenever the protection of the public is
inconsistent with other interests sought to be promoted, the protection of the public shall be
paramount.”)
39. Id. § 6001.1 (“Protection of the public . . . shall be the highest priority for the State Bar of
California and the board of trustees in exercising their licensing, regulatory, and disciplinary functions.
Whenever the protection of the public is inconsistent with other interests sought to be promoted, the
protection of the public shall be paramount.”)
40. Id. § 7303.1 (“Protection of the public shall be the highest priority for the Board of Barbering
and Cosmetology in exercising its licensing, regulatory, and disciplinary functions. Whenever the
protection of the public is inconsistent with other interests sought to be promoted, the protection of
the public shall be paramount.”).
41. Id. § 7000.6 (“Protection of the public shall be the highest priority for the Contractors’ State
License Board in exercising its licensing, regulatory, and disciplinary functions. Whenever the protection
of the public is inconsistent with other interests sought to be promoted, the protection of the public
shall be paramount.”).
42. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13500–13553.
43. Id. § 13510(a).
44. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.130 (2021); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2401 (2020); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 45-6-1 (2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-66 (West 2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17C-1 (2021);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106-L:1 (2020); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-28.2-1 (2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23-3-26 (2020); see also IOWA CODE § 80B.2 (2021) (“It is the intent of the legislature in creating the
academy and the council to maximize training opportunities for law enforcement officers, to coordinate
training and to set standards for the law enforcement service, all of which are imperative to upgrading
law enforcement to professional status.”); 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 705/1 (2021) (stating that Police
Standards Board is created “for the purpose of encouraging and aiding municipalities . . . in their efforts
to raise the level of law enforcement by upgrading and maintaining a high level of training and standards
for law enforcement executives and officers.”).
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states—Maine, Vermont, and Massachusetts—identify professional discipline as a
central goal of their respective POST commissions.45 Only two states—Indiana and
South Carolina—identify the promotion of equity as a purpose of the
POST commission.46
Most states provide no legislative statement of the mission or purpose of their
POST commissions.47 In the absence of a legislative mandate, many POST
commissions have adopted their own mission statements. Like the statutes that
create POST commissions, the mission statements that POST commissions adopt
typically focus on promoting police competence, excellence, or “professionalism”48
45. ME. STAT. tit. 25, § 2801(2) (2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2351 (2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 6E, § 3 (2021). In 2020, both Vermont and Massachusetts enacted laws substantially changing the
powers and composition of their respective POST commissions. See 2020 Vt. Acts & Resolves no. 219;
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2351 (2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6E, § 2 (2021). Prior to this 2020 legislation,
adjudicating charges of unprofessional conduct was not listed as a central goal for either the Vermont
Criminal Justice Training Council (now the Vermont Criminal Justice Council) or the Municipal Police
Training Committee (now the committee on police training commission, a subpart of a broader
Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission). See 2020 Vt. Acts & Resolves 219;
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2351; MASS .GEN. LAWS ch. 6E, § 2.
46. IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-1-1 (West 2020) (“In order to ensure the public safety and general
welfare of the people of the state of Indiana and to promote equity for all segments of society, a program
of mandatory training for law enforcement officers is established.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-23-10(a)
(2020) (“In order to ensure the public safety and general welfare of the people of this State, and to
promote equity for all segments of society, a program of training for law enforcement officers and
other persons employed in the criminal justice system in this State is hereby proclaimed and this chapter
must be interpreted to achieve these purposes principally through the establishment of minimum and
advance standards in law enforcement selection and training.”).
47. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.65.130 (West 2020); 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/1
(West 2021); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2401 (2020); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-6-1 (West 2021);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-66 (West 2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106-L:1 (2020);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17C-1 (West 2020); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-28.2-1 (West 2020).
48. See, e.g., N.H. POLICE STANDARDS & TRAINING COUNCIL, https://www.pstc.nh.gov/
[ https://perma.cc/GT66-UZWS ] (last visited July 17, 2021) (“The mission of NH Police Standards
and Training Council is to shape, sustain and strengthen the competency and professionalism of New
Hampshire law enforcement, in service to our State.”); PUB. SAFETY OFFICER STANDARDS
& TRAINING – POST – MONT. DEP’T JUST., https://dojmt.gov/post/ [ https://perma.cc/22VPAN86 ] (last visited July 17, 2021) (“To ensure competency and promote quality performance by public
safety officers by establishing, maintaining, and promoting excellence in standards and training.”);
About Us, ST. VT.: CRIM. JUST. TRAINING COUNCIL, https://vcjtc.vermont.gov
[ https://perma.cc/3XGA-53QN ] (last visited July 17, 2021) (“The mission of the Vermont Criminal
Justice Training Council is to improve public safety by promoting excellence in law enforcement
through the implementation of the highest standards for training, certification, and recognized best
practices.”); Mission, Values, Vision, COMMISSION ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING,
https://post.ca.gov/mission-values-vision [ https://perma.cc/46LZ-XY44 ] (last visited July 17, 2021);
Kentucky Law Enforcement Council, KENTUCKY JUSTICE & PUBLIC SAFETY CABINET,
https://justice.ky.gov/Boards-Commissions/Pages/klec.aspx [ https://perma.cc/PXP6-WG4N ] (last
visited July 24, 2021) (“Our mission statement is ‘Assist law enforcement agencies in hiring the best
qualified applicants available at the least cost with the least inconvenience in a timely manner
understanding throughout that agency pre-employment needs vary greatly by the size of the agency.’”);
ILL. L. ENFORCEMENT TRAINING & STANDARDS BOARD, https://www.ptb.illinois.gov/about/
agency-information/ [ https://perma.cc/NL3G-66N4 ] (last visited July 17, 2021) (“It is the mission of
the Board to provide standards and training which enhance the ability of law enforcement to readily
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without explicitly acknowledging that the public might require protection against
misconduct or discrimination by members of the profession. Only nine POST
mission statements mention officer ethics, integrity, or compliance with the law.49
Only one POST body, the Utah Peace Officer Standards and Training Division,
mentions the protection of citizens’ rights as a central aspect of its mission.50

and quickly adapt to our rapidly changing society and which can lead to public recognition of law
enforcement as a profession.”).
49. See ARIZ. PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING BOARD, https://post.az.gov/
[ https://perma.cc/WH9M-G4RB ] (last visited July 17, 2021) (“The Arizona Peace Officer Standards
and Training Board stands to foster public trust and confidence by establishing and maintaining
standards of integrity, competence, and professionalism for Arizona peace officers and correctional
officers.”); Criminal Justice Standards & Training Commission (CJSTC), FLA. DEP’T L. ENF’T, https://
www.fdle.state.fl.us/CJSTC/Commission/CJSTC-Home.aspx [ https://perma.cc/Q952-EPYQ ] (last
visited July 17, 2021) (“To ensure that all citizens of Florida are served by criminal justice officers who
are ethical, qualified, and well-trained.”); GA. PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING COUNCIL,
https://www.gapost.org/ [ https://perma.cc/NH98-TCZU ] (last visited June 29, 2021) (“[T]o provide
the citizens of Georgia with qualified, professionally trained, ethical and competent peace officers and
criminal justice professionals”); About KSCPOST, KAN. COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICERS’ STANDARDS
& TRAINING, https://www.kscpost.org/kscpost.html [ https://perma.cc/3456-N7V3 ] (last visited
July 17, 2021) (“providing the citizens of Kansas with qualified, trained, ethical, competent, and
professional peace officers. . . . [and] adopting and enforcing professional standards for certification of
peace officers to promote public safety and preserve public trust and confidence.”); Board on Law
Enforcement Standards and Training (BLEOST), MISS. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY: BLEOST,
https://www.dps.ms.gov/public-safety-planning/standards-and-training/BLEOST
[ https://
perma.cc/ML68-WU3P ] (last visited July 17, 2021) (“[T]o insure that law enforcement candidates are
selected according to high standards of education, fitness and morals”); About Us, NEV. COMM’N ON
PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING, http://post.nv.gov/About-Us/ [ https://
perma.cc/YZA5-3VFX ] (last visited July 17, 2021) (“To develop and deliver professional training
ensuring that all Nevada peace officers and their agencies comply with established statutes and
regulations.”); Criminal Justice Education & Training Standards, NC DEPT. OF JUST., https://
ncdoj.gov/law-enforcement-training/criminal-justice/ [ https://perma.cc/G88K-EX7J ] (last visited
July 17, 2021) (“[T]o assure that all of the State’s criminal justice officers are both competent and ethical
in the conduct of their duties.”); Criminal Justice Training and Certification, OREGON.GOV: DEP’T
PUB. SAFETY STANDARDS & TRAINING COMM’N, https://www.oregon.gov/dpsst/cj/pages/
default.aspx [ https://perma.cc/U2HC-64TF ] (last visited July 17, 2021) (“There are two critical
components of the DPSST Mission that work together to promote excellence in Oregon’s public safety
professions—delivering quality training and upholding professional standards . . . . Upholding
professional standards ensures the integrity of Oregon’s criminal justice system by ensuring that officers
meet and maintain all established training, physical, emotional, intellectual and moral fitness standards
for all public safety disciplines.”); TCOLE Mission, TEX. COMM’N ON L. ENF’T, https://
www.tcole.texas.gov/content/tcole-mission [ https://perma.cc/P35D-HQV5 ] (last visited July 17,
2021) (“[T]o establish and enforce standards to ensure that the people of Texas are served by highly
trained and ethical law enforcement, corrections, and telecommunications personnel.”); About POST,
UTAH DEP’T PUB. SAFETY, https://post.utah.gov/about-post-2/ [ https://perma.cc/TW7A-7NWQ ]
(last visited July 17, 2021) (stating that its mission includes “elevating the integrity of the profession.”).
50. About POST, supra note 49 (stating that their mission is to “provide professional standards
and training, leadership and certification for peace officers and dispatchers as we work to protect the
rights and privileges of Utah’s citizens while elevating the integrity of the profession”). In addition,
Oregon’s Board of Public Safety Standards and Training has adopted regulatory language stating that
its moral fitness standards are “critical to upholding the public’s trust in the public safety profession”
and “protecting the public.” See OR. ADMIN. R. 259-008-0300(1) (2021).
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It is in the public interest for POST commissions to set officer selection and
training standards, and POST commissions do this. It is equally important, though,
that POST commissions ensure that police officers behave in ethical and equitable
ways. In most states, neither the legislative mandate nor the POST mission
statement contains any explicit requirement that the commission protect the public
against misconduct or discrimination by police.51
While the well-being of communities requires the effective suppression of
crime, true public safety also requires that people—including victims, witnesses,
lawbreakers, observers, bystanders, and the general public—be protected against
discriminatory or violent policing. POST commissions can and should aim to
protect individuals and communities against the physical, dignitary, and
constitutional harms that can result from discriminatory, unethical, or abusive
policing. POST commissions should embrace—and state legislatures should
impose—an explicit obligation to prevent discrimination and promote
equitable policing.52
II. COMMUNITY REPRESENTATION ON POST COMMISSIONS
The reconstruction of POST commissions requires not only a shift in
legislative mandate, but also changes in membership. POST commissions might
view their responsibilities differently if residents of heavily policed communities,
justice-involved people, victims of police misconduct, criminal defense attorneys,
and civil rights advocates had a greater voice and representation on
POST commissions.
When Clarence Castile attended his first meeting as a newly appointed
member of the Minnesota Peace Officers Standards and Training Board in 2017,
his first initiative was to ask the Board to rename a new twelve-million dollar police
training fund after his nephew, Philando Castile.53 Minnesota police officer
Jeronimo Yanez had shot and killed the thirty-two-year-old Philando at a traffic
stop the prior year.54 “We don’t want to make any more Philando Castiles, and we
51. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 5-2-1-1 (2020) (“In order to ensure the public safety and general
welfare of the people of the state of Indiana and to promote equity for all segments of society, a program
of mandatory training for law enforcement officers is established.”); S.C. CODE § 23-23-10(a) (“In
order to ensure the public safety and general welfare of the people of this State, and to promote equity
for all segments of society, a program of training for law enforcement officers and other persons
employed in the criminal justice system in this State is hereby proclaimed and this chapter must be
interpreted to achieve these purposes principally through the establishment of minimum and advance
standards in law enforcement selection and training.”).
53. MINN. BD. OF PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING, BOARD MEETING ( July 27,
2017), https://dps.mn.gov/entity/post/about/meetingminutesdocumentlibrary/July%2027%202017
%20Board%20Minutes.pdf [ https://perma.cc/9R3F-MY56 ].
54. German Lopez, Philando Castile Minnesota Police Shooting: Officer Cleared of Manslaughter
Charge, VOX ( June 16, 2017, 4:15 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/7/7/12116288/minnesotapolice-shooting-philando-castile-falcon-heights-video [ https://perma.cc/LNA7-67XE ].
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don’t want any more officers in the shape or form of [J]eronimo Yanez,” Mr. Castile
argued.55 Despite the Governor’s support for renaming the fund, the POST Board
rejected the name change by a vote of eight to two, retaining the fund’s original
name: the Peace Officer Training Assistance Fund.56 Mr. Castile and the only other
public member of the POST Board were outvoted by the other eight members,57
all of whom were current or retired police officers or law enforcement instructors.58
POST Board Executive Director Nathan Gove later stated that he believed the
POST Board voted against renaming the training fund because the board “didn’t
want to get in the middle” and “does not want to be involved in sort of partisan,
high[ly] divisive issues.”59
In order to protect people against police discrimination and misconduct,
POST commissions should represent the communities that experience the most
intrusive and burdensome policing, such as Black,60 Indigenous,61 Latinx,62 and
LGBTQ+ people,63 people with disabilities,64 and people experiencing
55. MINN. BD. OF PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING, supra note 53, at 2.
56. Erin Golden, Police Standards Board Votes Against Naming Training Fund for Philando
Castile, STAR TRIB. (July 27, 2017, 10:01 PM), http://www.startribune.com/police-standards-boardvotes-against-naming-training-fund-for-philando-castile/436985783/ [ https://perma.cc/U3M6-9K2Q ].
57. MINN. BD. OF PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING, supra note 53, at 3. The
Minnesota legislature has since expanded its POST commission to include two additional public
members. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.841 (2020).
58. Id.; Law Enforcement AAS Instructors, ALEXANDRIA TECH. & CMTY. COLL., https://
www.alextech.edu/programs/law-enforcement-aas/instructors
[ https://perma.cc/EAN2-YP9D ]
(last visited July 17, 2021); Lakes Area Police Department Transitioning into New Era, CHISAGO
CNTY. PRESS (Dec. 1, 2016, 2:46 PM), https://chisagocountypress.com/main.asp?
SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=22589&SectionID=1 [ https://perma.cc/8839-V7KK ].
59. See Mara H. Gottfried, Police Standards Board Rejects Effort to Rename Training Fund for
Philando Castile, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS ( July 27, 2017, 6:57 PM), https://www.twincities.com/
2017/07/27/minnesota-police-standards-board-rejects-effort-to-name-training-fund-for-philandocastile/ [ https://web.archive.org/web/20170729220747/https://www.twincities.com/2017/07/27/
minnesota-police-standards-board-rejects-effort-to-name-training-fund-for-philando-castile/ ].
60. Ryan Gabrielson, Eric Sagara & Ryann Grochowski Jones, Deadly Force, in Black and
White: A ProPublica Analysis of Killings by Police Shows Outsize Risk for Young Black Males,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 10, 2014, 11:07 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/deadly-force-in-blackand-white [ https://perma.cc/65TN-77K9 ]; The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, GUARDIAN,
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-usdatabase [ https://perma.cc/2Z62-FVG3 ] (last visited July 17, 2021); Findings, STAN. OPEN POLICING
PROJECT, https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/findings/ [ https://perma.cc/Z4HF-5DK8 ] (last visited
June 29, 2021).
61. The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, supra note 60.
62. Id.
63. Protected and Served?, LAMBDA LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.org/protected-andserved [ https://perma.cc/P6AE-PRJD ] (last visited July 17, 2021); SANDY E. JAMES, JUDY
L. HERMAN, SUSAN RANKIN, MARA KEISLING, LISA MOTTET & MA’AYAN ANAFI, NAT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSGENDER EQUAL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 168 (2016),
https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/3J6S-S9DV ].
64. Ayobami Laniyonu & Phillip Atiba Goff, Policing the Most Vulnerable: Measuring Disparities
in Police Use of Force and Injury Among Persons with Serious Mental Illness (date) (unpublished
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homelessness.65 In reality, however, POST commissions are typically comprised
mainly of law enforcement officials and local government leaders, with limited (if
any) representation of other stakeholders.66 This is, fortunately, beginning to
change: in response to the nationwide protests of mid-2020, several states enacted
legislation to increase public representation on their POST commissions,67 and
Massachusetts became the first and only state to require a civilian majority on its
POST commission.68
The limited public representation on most POST commissions is a product of
legislative design: most statutes do not provide for any public participation in the
appointment or selection of most POST commissioners, and few seats are reserved
for community representatives. Most POST commission members are appointed
by the governor or another elected official.69 POST statutes typically require the
governor to appoint commissioners who represent city government and the law
enforcement side of the criminal justice system, such as police chiefs, patrol officers,
prosecutors, mayors, and city managers.70 These requirements can prevent
governors from appointing POST commissioners who reflect and represent the
interests of heavily policed communities even if they want to.71
Most states also reserve ex officio seats on the POST commission for certain
state, local, or federal government and public safety officials, such as mayors, state
attorneys general, and directors of local FBI field offices.72 Seventeen states also
reserve seats for officials or designees of bodies such as police unions, police
professional organizations, and interest groups representing local government
officials.73 New Jersey, for example, allots ten of the nineteen seats on its POST

manuscript) (on file with author).
65. Leila Miller, Use-of-Force Incidents Against Homeless People Are Up, LAPD reports,
L.A. TIMES ( Jan. 21, 2020, 10:12 PM), https://www.latimes.com/science/story/2020-01-21/
use-of-force-incidents-against-homeless-people-are-up-lapd-reports [ https://perma.cc/X9XQ-A26T ]
(reporting that, during the third quarter of 2019, one third of LAPD use of force incidents involved
people who were homeless); NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING NOT
HANDCUFFS 2019, at 50 (2019), http://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/HOUSING-NOTHANDCUFFS-2019-FINAL.pdf [ https://perma.cc/5ALQ-89DP ].
66. See infra Part II.
67. See infra note 85-91.
68. Chelsea Siegal, Gov. Baker Signs Police Reform Legislation, WWLP ( Jan. 7, 2021, 10:56 PM),
https://www.wwlp.com/news/massachusetts/gov-baker-signs-police-reform-legislation/ [ https://
perma.cc/3TA8-XHDY ].
69. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 13500; 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/3; GA. CODE ANN.
§ 35-8-3; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.315; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106-L:3.
70. Id.
71. See e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-23-30 (2020) (reserving all seats on POST commission for
law enforcement officers, corrections officials, and other government officials);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2403 (2020) (reserving all POST seats for law enforcement officials
and prosecutors).
72. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 13500 (West 2021); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/3 (West
2021); GA. CODE ANN. § 35-8-3 (West 2020); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.11 (West 2020).
73. ALA. CODE § 36-21-41 (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 8402 (2020); FLA. STAT. § 943.11
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commission to leaders of law enforcement and correctional professional
organizations.74 North Carolina reserves thirteen of the thirty-four seats on its
POST commission for the designees of various law enforcement professional
organizations.75 Only one state, Virginia, reserves seats for public defenders or
members of the defense bar.76
Half of U.S. states reserve POST commission seats for members of the public,
but these seats are often filled by people with strong ties to law enforcement. In
Ohio, for example, the sole “public” member of the Ohio Police Training
Commission worked as a probation officer for over twenty years.77 In Alaska, where
four of thirteen seats are reserved for members of the “public at large,” two of the
public seats are currently occupied by former police officers with over twenty years
of law enforcement experience each.78 In Arizona, all public members of the POST
board have strong ties to law enforcement.79 One “public” board member is a
retired prosecutor.80 Another is a former employee of the Arizona Department of
Public Safety, the founder of a nonprofit organization focused on serving law
(2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 35-8-3 (2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.315 (West 2021); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:2403 (2020); MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 3-203 (West 2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 116
(2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.603 (2020); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-6-5 (2021); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:17B-70 (West 2020); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 839 (McKinney 2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17C-3 (2021);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 3311 (2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 181A.360 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.20, § 2352
(2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-108 (2021).
74. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-70 (West 2020).
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17C-3 (2021).
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-108 (2021) (reserving a seat for the Executive Director of the Virginia
Indigent Defense Commission).
77. As of June 2021, the sole public representative on the Ohio Police Training Commission,
Wynette Carter-Smith, is married to a police officer and herself spent decades working as a probation
officer. See Ohio Peace Officer Training Commission, OHIO ATT’Y GEN., https://
www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Law-Enforcement/Ohio-Peace-Officer-Training-Academy/OhioPeace-Officer-Training-Commission [ https://perma.cc/UF6V-NZNF ] (last visited July 17, 2021);
Natalie Driscoll, Nettie Carter-Smith’s Life Has Been Fueled by a Passion to Serve, HUB SPRINGFIELD
(Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.hubspringfield.com/features/Nettie-Carter-Smith-082720.aspx
[ https://perma.cc/J7RQ-DZJ8 ].
78. As of June 2021, two of the three public members on the Alaska Police Standards
Commission—G “Scott” Campbell and Daniel Weatherly, were retired Alaska State Troopers. See
Confirmation Hearings: Alaska Police Standards Council Before the Senate State Affs. Standing
Comm., 31 Alaska State Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2020), http://www.akleg.gov/basis/
Meeting/Detail?Meeting=SSTA%202020-02-20%2015:30:00. [ https://perma.cc/L6CD-582D ]; Tom
Anderson, G. Scott Campbell, Tom Clemons, John Murphy & John Tidlwell Jr., This ‘John Doe Free
Pass’ Judge Deserves A ‘No’ Vote From Alaskans Who Care About Violent Sex Crimes, MUST READ
ALASKA (Oct. 28, 2020), https://mustreadalaska.com/this-john-doe-free-pass-judge-deserves-a-novote-from-alaskans-who-care-about-violent-sex-crimes/ [ https://perma.cc/3CGR-4LWZ ] (“G. Scott
Campbell is a Alaska State Trooper (Retired) and former Director of Public Safety & Chief of Police
for the North Slope Borough Police Department. He is a retired U.S. Marine.”)
79. See infra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
80. Board Members, ARIZ. PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING BD., https://
post.az.gov/about-us/board-members [ https://perma.cc/3VF8-JP2F ] (last visited July 17, 2021);
Leesa Berens Weisz, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/leesa-berens-weisz-31982510 (last
visited July 17, 2021).
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enforcement, military, and first responders, and is married to a police officer.81 A
third board member, appointed to represent higher education, is a retired
police executive.82
People with strong ties to law enforcement can occupy ostensibly public seats
on POST commissions because many states that reserve such seats either fail to
define the term “public,”83 or state simply that public members must not be law
enforcement officers,84 leaving open the possibility that they could be occupied by
former law enforcement officers or other people with strong financial, professional,
or family ties to law enforcement. Only seven states reserve seats for members of
the public who have never served as law enforcement officers and have no business
or professional connections to law enforcement.85 Even fewer reserve seats for
individuals who represent the interests of heavily-policed communities.86
Connecticut is the only state that reserves POST commission seats for
“justice-impacted” people.87 Only Vermont reserves a seat for a person with lived
experience of mental illness.88 A few states reserve seats for advocates for groups
81. Id.; Ariz. Peace Officer Standards and Training Bd., Minutes of the December 19, 2018
Meeting of the Arizona Peace Officer Standards and Training Board 2 (2018), https://post.az.gov/
sites/default/files/121918%20Minutes.pdf [ https://perma.cc/C35W-SM4J ] (“Jamie Kelly has been
selected to fill the public member vacancy on the Board. She is the current executive director of Not
All Heroes.”); Jaime Kelly, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/jamiekelly (last visited July 17,
2021) (describing Not All Heroes as an organization “dedicated to providing the necessary connections
for individuals in need while serving Law Enforcement, Fire Service, Dispatchers, Military and Veterans
as well as families.”); Not All Heroes, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/notallheroes/ (last
visited July 17, 2021) (“I am lucky to be the wife of a Glendale Police Officer. Although he does not
consider himself to be a hero, to me he is a true hero . . . . Not All Heroes was founded due to the need
for a single location of available resources and assistance for the true heroes in our community.”).
82. Board Members, supra note 80; About Us, ARIZ. PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING
BD., https://post.az.gov/about-us [ https://perma.cc/K9F3-ZUBN ] (last visited July 17, 2021); Kevin
Robinson, ARIZ. ST. UNIV., https://ccj.asu.edu/content/kevin-robinson-1 [ https://perma.cc/9AGHBDRV ] (last visited July 17, 2021).
83. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.101.030 (West 2020); OHIO REV.CODE ANN.
§ 109.71 (West 2020); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1407 (2020); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.841 (West 2020).
84. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 13500 (West 2021) (stating public members “shall not be law
enforcement officers”); WIS. STAT. § 15.255 (2021).
85. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-7-3 (2020) (requiring that citizen members may not be “a police
officer or retired police officer or have familial or financial connections to a police officer or any
agency or department for which a police officer works.”); MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 3-203 (West
2020); MO. REV. STAT. § 590.120 (2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 181A.360 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 38-8-102 (2021); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.051 (West 2019). New Hampshire and Vermont
prohibit public from having family connections to law enforcement, but not financial connections.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106-L:3 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2352 (2021).
86. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-294b(b) (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.603 (2020);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6E, § 2 (2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.620 (2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-108
(2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2352 (2021); see also D.C. CODE § 5-107.03 (2021).
87. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-294b(b) (2020). Connecticut previously reserved five seats on its
board for “public members,” but did not define the term. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-294b(a) (2020).
88. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2352 (West 2020). Connecticut also reserves two seats for
members who may be either people with disabilities or advocates for people with disabilities.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-294b(b) (2020).
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that experience disparate policing89 or members of state civil rights offices.90 Most
states that reserve POST commission seats for members of or advocates for heavily
policed communities did so after the nationwide protests in mid-2020.91
While police leadership, retired police officers, and police union
representatives bring subject-matter expertise to the project of professional
regulation, they have no particular expertise in civil rights law, racial or social justice,
or the effects of policing on public health. Nor can police officers adequately
represent the priorities of heavily policed communities. They do not necessarily
know how their practices may affect members of communities that are burdened
by intense or confrontational policing, and they are unlikely to propose the same
solutions that community members might suggest.
By contrast, nearly every regulatory body that oversees law, medicine, or
nursing requires substantial public representation. Public representatives are
required for medical boards in forty-nine states and for boards of nursing in all fifty
states.92 Medical boards reserve, on average, twenty-five percent of seats for
nonphysicians.93 The American Bar Association’s Model Rules for Lawyer

89. VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-108 (2021) (reserving a seat for the Executive Director of the Virginia
Indigent Defense Commission); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2352 (2021) (reserving seats on the Vermont
Criminal Justice Council for one mental health crisis worker and two people nominated by the Vermont
chapter of the NAACP); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-294b(b) (2020) (reserving two seats for members
who may be either advocates for people with disabilities or people with disabilities);
MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 3-201 (West 2020) (reserving a seat on the Maryland POST
commission for a person with expertise in mental health); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6E, § 2 (2021)
(reserving seats on the Massachusetts POST commission for a social worker, for an attorney nominated
by the civil rights and social justice section council of the Massachusetts Bar Association, and a person
nominated by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.). In addition, the District of
Columbia recently enacted temporary legislation requiring that its POST board include five community
representatives, one each with expertise in law enforcement oversight, juvenile justice reform, criminal
defense, violence prevention or intervention, and gender-based violence or LGBTQ advocacy, as well
as the Executive Director of the Office of Police Complaints. See also D.C. CODE § 5-107.03 (2021)
(temporarily reserving POST seats for community members with expertise in law enforcement
oversight, juvenile justice reform, criminal defense, violence prevention or intervention, and
gender-based violence or LGBTQ advocacy. This legislation is set to expire 225 days after
taking effect.).
90. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2352 (2021) (reserving seats for the Vermont Director of Racial
Equity and a person nominated by the Executive Director of the Vermont Civil Rights Commission);
see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.620 (2020) (reserving, via executive order, a POST commission seat
for the Executive Director of the Michigan Department of Civil Rights).
91. In 2020, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Connecticut enacted laws changing the composition
of their respective POST commissions. See 2020 Vt. Acts & Resolves no. 219; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 2351 (2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6E, § 2 (2021); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-294b(b) (2020); See also
supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text.
92. NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE BDS. OF NURSING, 2019 BOARD STRUCTURE SURVEY (2019),
https://www.ncsbn.org/2019BoardStructure.pdf [ https://perma.cc/E52A-TMWR ]; FED’N OF
STATE MED. BDS., BOARD COMPOSITION (2019), https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/keyissues/state-medical-board-composition.pdf [ https://perma.cc/39U2-74WN ].
93. See FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 92.
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Disciplinary Enforcement recommend that public members comprise at least
one-third of each attorney disciplinary board.94
Public representation on state regulatory boards is even more important for
policing than for other regulated professions. No other profession is entrusted with
the power to take away life or liberty in the name of the state. Like doctors and
other healthcare professionals, police officers make on-the-job decisions with
life-and-death consequences. Yet people who are harmed by police often have
limited remedies available to them.95 A person who is harmed by a physician, nurse,
or lawyer can litigate through the ordinary civil process. Moreover, the companies
and institutions that employ such professionals face potential liability when their
members engage in professional misconduct. Furthermore, a person who is
dissatisfied with the behavior of a nurse, physician, or lawyer can often choose to
be served by a different practitioner. By contrast, members of the community
typically have no say over which officers are assigned to police their communities.
If they experience loss, injury, or discrimination at the hands of a police officer,
they face special barriers to litigation not faced by other civil litigants.96 The
imbalance of power between citizens and police necessitates an exceptionally strong
community voice in police governance.
More states should follow the lead of states such as Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and Vermont and revise their POST commissions’ membership
criteria to give greater voice to the non-police public, especially members of heavily
policed communities. States should reserve a substantial portion of seats on their
POST commission for people who have never been employed by a police
department and who have no familial or financial connections to any police officer
or agency.97 Most of these non-police public seats should be reserved for members
of and advocates for communities that often experience burdensome policing, such
as Black, Native, and Latinx people, people with lived experience of mental illness,
and justice-impacted people.
III. STATEWIDE REGULATION OF POLICING TO PROTECT COMMUNITIES
Motivated POST commissions could protect the public against unjust policing
in a number of ways. First, POST commissions, which act as gatekeepers to the
profession of policing statewide, can screen out unsuitable police applicants before
they ever patrol a community. Second, POST commissions can reshape policing

94.
95.

MODEL RULES FOR LAW. DISCIPLINARY ENF’T r. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
Rachel Harmon, Limited Leverage: Federal Remedies and Policing Reform, 32
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33 (2012).
96. Schwartz, supra note 24, at 450–54 (citing barriers to police accountability litigation such as
qualified immunity); see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
97. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-7-3 (2020) (requiring that citizen members of POST
commissions may not be “a police officer or retired police officer or have familial or financial
connections to a police officer or any agency or department for which a police officer works”).
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ethics and practice through their power to regulate training and set minimum policy
standards that every law enforcement agency must follow. Third, POST
commissions can decertify officers who have engaged in acts of violence or
misconduct. This section proposes rules that POST commissions could adopt in
each of these areas to better protect the public from incompetent, discriminatory,
or abusive policing.
A. Screen Out Unfit Police Applicants
Police officers are empowered by the state to use force, including lethal force,
to compel submission. They must use this power only when necessary, and officers
must be scrupulously vetted to ensure that they will not abuse it. Because civil
service protections and union contracts typically make it difficult to remove officers
once they are hired, pre-employment screening is crucial.98
Failure to screen out dangerous or unfit recruits can result in the death of
innocent people. In November 2014, twelve-year-old Tamir Rice was playing with
a toy gun at a public playground.99 Cleveland police officer Timothy Loehmann
shot him on sight.100 Two years earlier, Loehmann had been forced to resign from
another Ohio police department for repeated failure to follow directions on firearm
safety and because he had become dangerously distracted and weepy during
firearms training.101 Nonetheless, he was hired by the Cleveland Police Department
in March 2014. Eight months later, he shot Tamir Rice.102
POST commissions can and should adopt standards for pre-employment
screening that require all law enforcement agencies to reject candidates whose
behavioral histories seem incompatible with lawful and equitable policing, such as
violence; discrimination; hate group membership; or problems with impulse
control, anger management, or emotional regulation. The two most common
pre-employment screening tools prescribed by state law are background checks and
psychological fitness screenings.103

98. See Rushin, supra note 29; Fisk & Richardson, supra note 29. For example, one Massachusetts
police department has twice attempted to fire one officer for assaulting women both on and off duty.
Each time, the officer successfully challenged his termination in arbitration. Peter Goonan & Patrick
Johnson, Twice-fired Springfield Police Officer Anthony Bedinelli Has Termination Overturned,
M ASS L IVE (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.masslive.com/news/2019/02/twice-fired-springfieldpolice-officer-anthony-bedinelli-has-termination-overturned.html [ https://perma.cc/LKE3-DQFB ].
99. Shaila Dewan & Richard A. Oppel Jr., In Tamir Rice Case, Many Errors by Cleveland
Police, Then a Fatal One, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
01/23/us/in-tamir-rice-shooting-in-cleveland-many-errors-by-police-then-a-fatal-one.html [ https://
perma.cc/H39F-ZUH7 ].
100. Id.
101. Tom McCarthy, Cleveland Officer Who Fatally Shot Tamir Rice Judged Unfit for Duty in
2012, GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2014, 3:52 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/dec/03/
officer-who-fatally-shot-tamir-rice-had-been-judged-unfit [ https://perma.cc/ZZW6-BZT5 ].
102. Id.; Dewan & Oppel, supra note 99.
103. See infra notes 104, 141–142 and accompanying text.
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1. Comprehensive Background Checks
Almost all states require prospective officers to complete some form of
background check before they can begin duty.104 The stringency of these
background check requirements, however, varies widely among states. POST
commissions can increase the likelihood that mandatory pre-employment
background checks screen out candidates who might harm the public by setting
clear, robust, and mandatory behavioral history standards for police candidates;
establishing thorough background check procedures, including social media
checks;105 and verifying that new police officers satisfy the minimum requirements.
First, state legislatures and POST commissions should set minimum selection
standards designed to identify individuals who are likely to engage in unethical,
abusive, or discriminatory policing. Most states require that all prospective and
current officers demonstrate good moral character,106 and most disqualify
prospective police officers who have been convicted of felony offenses or specified
misdemeanors.107 There is, however, no uniformity in state regulations that define
good moral character or lack thereof.108 Factors commonly included in moral
character definitions include criminal history, past drug use, false statements to
POST, and a history of discipline by a different state POST commission.109 Many
relevant behavioral patterns, though, go unmentioned in POST regulations defining
moral character and other minimum selection standards. For example, a few states
104. Cf. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2403–2405.7 (2020) (setting minimum training standards but not
minimum behavioral history standards); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 4703 (2021) (same);
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:1–5.1 (2021) (setting minimum certification standards that do not include
background check requirement); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 6000.4–.8 (2021) (setting
physical fitness standards, but not moral character or background check requirements).
105. See, e.g., MICH. COMM’N ON L. ENF’T STANDARDS, ADVISORY STANDARD AND
SELECTED BEST PRACTICES FOR BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS (2019), https://
www.michigan.gov/documents/mcoles/Background_Investigation_Advisory_Standard_Final_10-172019_668906_7.pdf [ https://perma.cc/CK6G-GYJE ].
106. Cf. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-31-305(1)(a) (2021); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 7-294e-16(a)
(2021); MASS .GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 116 (2021); 550 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.06 (2020); MO. CODE REGS.
ANN. tit. 11, § 75-13.020 (2005); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 840(2) (McKinney 2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70,
§ 3311 (2020); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 109:2-1-03 (2020); 270-30-00 R.I. CODE R. § 2.4 (2020); VA. CODE
ANN. §15.2-1705(A) (2021).
107. See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 85.010(b)(1) (2021), COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 24-31-305(1)(A) (2021); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 7-294E-16(A) (2021); OHIO ADMIN. CODE
109:2-1-03 (2020).
108. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0011(1)–(3) (2021); OR. ADMIN.
R. 259-008-0010(5) (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53-6-203, -211 (West 2021); CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 11, § 1953 (2021); 12 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 09B .0101 (2020); 79 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 005.02 (2020).
109. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0011(1)–(3) (2021); OR. ADMIN.
R. 259-008-0010(5) (2021); 12 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 09B .0101 (2020); 79 NEB. ADMIN. CODE
§ 005.02 (2020).
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define a history of excessive force,110 sexual harassment or misconduct,111
dishonesty,112 or discrimination113 as evidence of lack of moral character, but many
other states do not mention any of these.114 Many statutes and POST regulations
leave “moral character” completely undefined.115
POST commissions could and should require background checks not only for
criminal history and substance abuse, but also for any history of domestic or other
violence, professional misconduct, or dishonesty. Ties to white supremacist
organizations or a known history of discrimination or domestic violence should be
disqualifying evidence of poor moral character.116 Florida, for example, prescribes
that an officer has failed to maintain good moral character if he or she
(1) knowingly, willfully, and actively participates in an activity intended to benefit a
hate group, as defined in statute; or (2) engages in discriminatory conduct that does
not involve an expression of public concern and that would cause a reasonable
person to believe that the officer cannot perform the duties of office in a fair and
impartial manner.117
POST commissions should also set clear and stringent background check
procedures to ensure that background investigators identify red flags in a police
candidate’s behavioral history. Some POST commissions have specified minimum

110. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0011 (2021); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN.
Pol. 301.05(m) (2021); OR. ADMIN. R. 259-008-0300(5) (2021).
111. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0011 (2021); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN.
Pol. 301.05(m) (2021).
112. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0011 (2021); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN.
Pol. 301.05(m) (2021); OR. ADMIN. R. 259-008-0010(6) (2021).
113. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0011 (2021).
114. See, e.g., 12 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 09B .0101 (2020); MISSISSIPPI PEACE OFFICER
STANDARDS AND TRAINING (BLEOST) PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES
MANUAL § 101.03(5) (2013); COMM’N ON L. ENF ’T STANDARDS & TRAINING, ARK. DEP’T OF
PUB. SAFETY, CLEST RULES 1001, 1002(3)(3); S.D. ADMIN. R. 2:01:02:01(4) (2021); MICH. ADMIN.
CODE r. 28.14203(e) (2021); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1110-020.03(1)(i) (2019); 250 IND. ADMIN.
CODE 2-3-5 (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5605(b)(5) (2020).
115. See, e.g., COMM’N ON L. ENF’T STANDARDS & TRAINING, ARK. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY,
supra note 114, at 1001, 1002(3)(3); S.D. ADMIN. R. 2:01:02:01(4) (2021); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r.
28.14203(e) (2021); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1110-020.03(1)(i) (2019); 250 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2-3-5
(2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5605(b)(5) (2020.
116. Seventy-two officers in Philadelphia were put on desk-duty in 2019 after The Plain View
Project publicized hundreds of racist and violent Facebook posts by law enforcement officers in several
departments across the country. Orion Donovan-Smith & Kayla Epstein, 72 Philadelphia Police Officers
Pulled Off Street Amid Probe Into Racist Facebook Posts, WASH. POST ( June 20, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/06/20/philadelphia-cops-pulled-off-street-amidprobe-into-racist-facebook-posts/ [https://perma.cc/L9JD-CELY]; Emily Hoerner & Rick Tulsky,
Cops Around the Country Are Posting Racist and Violent Messages on Facebook, INJUSTICE WATCH,
https://www.injusticewatch.org/interactives/cops-troubling-facebook-posts-revealed/ [ https://
perma.cc/73TT-GXS4 ] (last visited July 16, 2021); see also ); see also Kim Shayo Buchanan, Hilary
Rau, Kerry Mulligan, Tracie Keesee & Phillip Atiba Goff, White Supremacy in Policing: How Law
Enforcement Agencies Can Respond, CTR. FOR POLICING EQUITY (2021)..
117. FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 11B-27.0011(15)(a)–(b) (2021).
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areas of inquiry for background checks of would-be officers.118 In Arizona, for
example, pre-employment background checks must include the applicant’s criminal
record, driving record, education verification, military history, a polygraph
examination, and interviews with the applicant’s relatives, neighbors, and past
employers.119 Missouri, by contrast, requires only a fingerprint check against state
and federal criminal records.120 Other POST commissions are vague as to what a
pre-employment background check should entail: Montana’s POST regulations, for
example, say only that the required background check should verify an applicant’s
good moral character and be “thorough.”121
Finally, POST commissions could conduct or review the background checks
themselves, rather than relying on the hiring law enforcement agency to conduct
them.122 While some POST commissions require the hiring law enforcement agency
to submit verification that a background check was completed,123 they do not
typically conduct routine review of the stringency or results of police departments’
background checks.124
When the background check is performed by the police department that seeks
to hire the applicant, conflicts of interest may arise, especially when the department
faces a hiring shortage.125 Background check requirements may narrow a police
department’s available applicant pool,126 tempting the hiring law enforcement

118. See, e.g., NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 289.110 (2018); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 1953 (2021);
FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 11B-27.0011 (2021); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. POL. 301.05(m) (2021); 37 PA.
CODE § 203.11 (2021); OR. ADMIN. R. § 259-008-0015 (2021).
119. See ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R13-4-106 (2019).
120. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 11, § 75-13.020 (2005).
121. MONT. ADMIN. R. 23.13.201(2)(e) (2020).
122. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, §§ 1950, 1953 (2021); FLA. ADMIN. CODE r.
11B-27.0022 (2020); ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 13-4-106 (2019).
123. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 11B-27.0022 (2020); FLA. DEP’T OF L. ENF’T, STANDARDS,
FORM CJSTC-77, EMPLOYMENT BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, https://www.fdle.
state.fl.us/CJSTC/Documents/Rules-Forms/Table-1-Forms/PDFs/CJSTC-77.aspx [ https://perma.cc/
TF29-F62Y ]; ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 13-4-106 (2019).
124. In California, departments must retain narrative background reports for audit, but these
are not reviewed pre-certification. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, §§ 1950, 1953 (2021); see also
CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING, POST BACKGROUND
INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL: GUIDELINES FOR THE INVESTIGATOR 2020, at 4-13, 4-15 (2020),
https://post.ca.gov/portals/0/post_docs/publications/background-investigation-manual/Background
_Investigation.pdf [ https://perma.cc/N8RV-HEEH ].
125. Kristine Frazo, Police Staffing Shortages a Nationwide Trend, ABC 7 NEWS (Jan. 1, 2020),
https://wjla.com/news/nation-world/police-staffing-shortages-a-nationwide-trend
[ https://
perma.cc/65AS-YJ6Y ].
126. For example, in 2018, roughly eighty-five percent of applicants to the Portland Police
Department failed to pass required background checks. Lindsay Nadrich, Portland Police, Struggling to
Find Qualified Candidates, Have More Than 100 Openings, KGW 8 (May 23, 2019, 7:27 AM), https://
www.kgw.com/article/news/local/portland-police-struggling-to-find-qualified-candidates-have-more
-than-100-openings/283-1a138c49-d308-44df-9c3d-970c298f0803 [ https://web.archive.org/web/
20190523180958/https://www.kgw.com/article/news/local/portland-police-struggling-to-find-qualified
-candidates-have-more-than-100-openings/283-1a138c49-d308-44df-9c3d-970c298f0803 ].
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agency to relax its minimum selection standards and ignore behavioral red flags. In
2009, for example, the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department loosened its character
standards during a major hiring push, hiring applicants who had criminal records or
histories of misconduct as police officers at other agencies.127 Many of these new
officers committed additional crimes after they were hired.128 In rural areas, the
effects of hiring shortages can be even more severe. In 2019, for example, despite
an Alaska law disqualifying people with domestic violence convictions from
working as police officers,129 all seven police officers in Stebbens, Alaska, were men
with prior convictions for domestic violence.130 Town administrators said they had
been unable to find applicants without such histories.131
POST commissions might, like many state bar associations, retain
investigators to assess whether police applicants meet the minimum standards set
by state statutes and POST regulations.132 They could also require police
departments’ background investigators to notify the POST commission whenever
they uncover evidence that a candidate may have a history of violence, substance
abuse, discrimination, or other disqualifying conduct—even if the candidate denies
the allegations or offers evidence of subsequent rehabilitation.
POST commissions can also discourage rehiring of problem officers from
other agencies by being more transparent with the public. More states could follow
the example of Oregon’s Department of Public Safety Standards and Training,
which operates a publicly accessible online database of law enforcement
certification and decertification records.133 This step, though standard among other

127. L.A. CNTY. OFF. INDEP. REV., REVIEW OF LOS ANGELES SHERIFF’S BACKGROUND
INVESTIGATIONS PROCESS (Feb. 18, 2009), http://shq.lasdnews.net/shq/LASD_Oversight/
LASDBackground.pdf [ https://perma.cc/GN99-8XHZ ].
128. Id.
129. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 85.010(b)(1) (2021).
130. Kyle Hopkins, Dozens of Convicted Criminals Have Been Hired as Cops in Rural Alaska.
Sometimes, They’re the Only Applicants. ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS ( Jul. 18, 2019), https://
www.adn.com/lawless/2019/07/18/the-alaska-village-where-every-cop-has-been-convicted-of-domestic
-violence/ [ https://perma.cc/U7J3-7JD5 ].
131. Id. Most perpetrators of domestic violence are men. If Stebbens had chosen instead to
recruit women, the town might not have had to resort to an all-male police force made up entirely of
convicted domestic abusers. MATTHEW R. DUROSE, CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, PATRICK
A. LANGAN, MARK MOTIVANS, RAMONA R. RANTALA & ERICA L. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS.,
NCJ 207846, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS 13 ( 2005), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/fvs02.pdf [ https://perma.cc/HC2F-ZHE6 ] (finding men comprised 75.6% of family
violence offenders).
132. See Character and Fitness Investigations, NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAM’RS, http://
www.ncbex.org/character-and-fitness/ [ https://perma.cc/73HF-RMX6 ] (last visited July 17, 2021).
133. OR. CRIM. JUST. INFO. RECS. INQUIRY SYS., http://dpsstnet.state.or.us/
PublicInquiry_CJ/smsgoperson.aspx
[ https://web.archive.org/web/20210224044537/http://
dpsstnet.state.or.us/PublicInquiry_CJ/smsgoperson.aspx ] (last visited Feb. 24, 2021).
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professional governing bodies,134 is unusual among POST commissions.135
Congress could also support the work of state POST commissions by creating a
national database of fired and decertified officers, similar to the National
Practitioner Data Bank for healthcare practitioners.136 A national database could
require police departments to report officer terminations, resignations under threat
of termination, civil judgments, and settlement payments. Background investigators
and hiring agencies could then query this database when conducting background
checks on new hires.137
State legislatures could also direct POST commissions to create similar
databases at the state level. Colorado, for example, recently passed a statute
requiring the POST board to create a searchable public database of officer
untruthfulness, decertifications, and terminations.138 POST commissions can also
contribute to—and require hiring agencies to query—the National Decertification
Index,139 a voluntary, partial database of decertification actions maintained by the
International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards
and Training.140
2. Impartial Psychological Screenings
Psychological fitness screenings are another common tool for screening new
police hires. Twenty-five states require prospective officers to demonstrate
psychological fitness prior to employment, 141 and two more provide for conditional
134.

DAVID A. JOHNSON & HUMAYUN J. CHAUDHRY, MEDICAL LICENSING AND DISCIPLINE
220–21 (2012).
135. See Information Records Inquiry System - I.R.IS., OREGON.GOV, https://www.oregon.gov/
dpsst/PS/Pages/IRIS.aspx [ https://perma.cc/7Z8S-4T44 ] (last visited July 17, 2021).
136. OFF. OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST
CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY
POLICING (2015); See Ben Grunwald & John Rappaport, The Wandering Officer, 129 YALE L.J. 1676,
1760–61 (2020) (proposing federal database of fired officers).
137. See Grunwald & Rappaport, supra note 136.
138. S. 20-217, 72nd Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2020).
139. The NDI is not available to the general public but can be queried by hiring law
enforcement agencies. About NDI, INT’L ASS’N DIRS. L. ENF’T STANDARDS & TRAINING, https://
www.iadlest.org/our-services/ndi/about-ndi [ https://perma.cc/F99L-73FH ] (last visited July
17, 2021).
140. The International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training
is a private non-governmental organization comprised of POST directors of every state in the United
States. IADLEST FACT SHEET, INT’L ASS’N OF DIRS. OF L. ENF’T STANDARDS & TRAINING (2021),
https://www.iadlest.org/Portals/0/IADLEST%20Fact%20Sheet%205-11-20_1.pdf?ver=ACWVhU
R66V36RadIPplxNA%3d%3d [https://perma.cc/3KAK-2BTH].
141. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 85.010 (a) (2021); ARK. ADMIN. CODE
§ 132.00.1-1002(i) (2020); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 599.975 (2021); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-31-303(5)(b) (2021); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 7-294e-16 (2004); 1-800-801 DEL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.5 (2020); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 501-2.2 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5605(b)(6) (2020);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.382 (15) (2021); 16-227-3 ME. CODE R. § 3(L) (2020); MD. CODE ANN.,
PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERVS. § 12.04.01.04(F)(2) (2021); MINN. R. 6700.0700, subpart 1 (H) (2021);
MISS. PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING, BLEOST PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATION POLICY
IN AMERICA
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psychological evaluation of candidates based on criminal history or when
background investigations raise questions about their emotional health
or stability.142
Police officers have enormous discretion and must make judgments about use
of force—including deadly force—in tense, time-pressured encounters.143 The
ability to think clearly and exercise good judgment under pressure, then, is an
essential job qualification for police officers. A history of mental illness or mental
health treatment should not necessarily be disqualifying, and states should avoid
adopting policies that would discourage officers from seeking treatment for
addiction, anxiety, depression, or post-traumatic stress disorder, all of which police
officers experience at high rates.144 But untreated or uncontrolled mental or
substance abuse disorders may interfere with officers’ competent discharge of
their duties.145
Pre-employment interviews by psychologists could also provide an additional
opportunity to identify behavioral tendencies and patterns that may predict future
misconduct, such as poor impulse control, cynicism, dishonesty, aggressive or
antagonistic behavior, and substance abuse.146 While some of these behavioral
patterns might be identified in a thorough investigative background check, criminal
background checks will miss problematic behavioral patterns that did not result in
arrest or conviction. Even when an agency has conducted a comprehensive
background check, psychological interviews provide a way for agencies to follow up
on the findings of the background check.147
The stringency of mandatory psychological screening varies widely across
states. In Alaska, for example, a prospective officer must submit a form completed
and signed by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist stating that the candidate is
“mentally capable of performing the essential functions of the job of police officer
AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 101.03(4), at 117, https://www.sos.ms.gov/ACProposed/
00013666b.pdf [ https://perma.cc/599L-LW3E ]; NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 289.110(2)(i) (2018); N.H.
REV. STAT. § 106-L:6 (VI) (2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-7-6(6) (2018); 12 N.C. ADMIN. CODE
9B.0101(6)(2020);, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-63-06(4) (2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3311 (E)(1)(c)
(2020); 37 Pa. Code § 203.11(a)(7) (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-8-106(9) (West 2020); TEX. OCC.
CODE ANN. § 1701.306 (a)(1) (West 2019); VT. ADMIN. CODE 6-1-1:16(g) (2020); WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 139-07-030(2) (2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-704(b)(vii) (West 2020).
142. ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 650-X-2-.05(3) (2017) (requiring psychological testing for those
applicants with past, enumerated misdemeanor convictions); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 11-11-01-061
(2017) (requiring psychological testing “where a question of emotional stability or disorder is indicated
by physician or the background investigation. . .”).
143. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
144. See Brian A. Chopko, Patrick A. Palmieri & Richard E. Adams, Associations Between Police
Stress and Alcohol Use: Implications for Practice, 18 J. LOSS & TRAUMA 482 (2013).
145. Id.
146. GARY L. FISCHLER, IDENTIFYING PSYCHOLOGICAL PREDICTORS OF POLICE OFFICER
INTEGRITY PROBLEMS (2004), https://psycheval.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/IntegrityProject-Final-Report-12-19-04.pdf [ https://perma.cc/X3ED-K5T6 ].
147. Id.
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and is free from any emotional disorder that may adversely affect the person’s
performance.”148 Psychological evaluations limited to questions of mental capacity
and the presence or absence of diagnosable mental disorders may not be sufficient
to uncover disqualifying behavioral patterns, such as violence, poor impulse control,
and discrimination.149
In California, on the other hand, POST regulations specify that
pre-certification mental evaluations must consider not only the absence of
psychological disorders, but whether the candidate has any “job relevant
psychological, emotional or mental traits [or] characteristics” that might adversely
affect performance.150 A qualified mental health professional must interview each
prospective officer and submit a detailed report to the screening program’s chief
psychologist explaining whether the candidate meets the minimum psychological
standards for appointment.151 Also, recent California legislation requires the POST
commission to review and update its psychological screening standards no later than
January 1, 2022, to incorporate identification of explicit and implicit bias based on
race, ethnicity, gender, nationality, religion, disability, or sexual orientation.152
B. Reshape Police Standards and Culture
POST commissions can also reshape policing norms, rules, and practices.
POST commissions are generally responsible for police training, which has a strong
influence on departmental cultures and professional norms. In some states, POST
commissions can also define policy standards that police departments must adopt
or exceed.153
POST commissions can use these powers to build professional norms that will
protect heavily policed communities. While organizational change and increased
accountability are crucial to ensuring that departments implement policies in good
faith, written polices and training norms set expectations and lay the foundation for
professional accountability. Social science research suggests that people are less
likely to discriminate or use violence when rules of decision or behavioral norms
are clear and unambiguous.154
148.
149.

See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 85.010(a) (2021).
See
James
F.
Albrecht,
POLICE
BRUTALITY,
MISCONDUCT
AND
CORRUPTION: CRIMINOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 37–39 (2017); ELLEN
M. SCRIVNER, THE ROLE OF POLICE PSYCHOLOGY IN CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE FORCE (1994).
150. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 599.975 (2021).
151. Id.; see also CAL. COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING, PEACE
OFFICER PSYCHOLOGICAL SCREENING MANUAL (2020), https://post.ca.gov/portals/0/post_docs/
publications/psychological-screening-manual/Peace_Officer_Psychological_Screening_Manual.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/Q9VF-4CBG ].
152. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1031.3 (West 2021).
153. See infra Section III.B.2.
154. Phillip Atiba Goff & Hilary Rau, Predicting Bad Policing: Theorizing Burdensome and Racially
Disparate Policing Through the Lenses of Social Psychology and Routine Activities, 687 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 67, 67–88 (2020).
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1. Police Training and Continuing Education
POST commissions have broad influence over the curriculum, rigor, and
methodology of police training and over who provides it.155 They certify, and in
many cases operate, basic training academies that all newly hired police officers
must attend. They ensure that officers meet statutory minimum training
requirements, and they have broad powers to require additional in-service
training.156 POST commissions regulate the number of training hours that officers
must complete and the topics that training must cover.157 POST commissions
determine which academies, instructors, and courses satisfy these requirements158
and, in some states, determine which law enforcement training programs can be
reimbursed with state funds.159 POST commissions can and should leverage their
powers over police training to promote equitable policing and reduce unnecessary
use of force.
Most police academies spend many more hours teaching applicants how to
use a firearm than they spend on teaching de-escalation. The average police trainee
receives fifty-eight hours of firearms training, but only eight hours of training on
de-escalation.160 Most officers will never fire a gun in their entire career,161 but
nearly all officers will often face the much more common challenge of de-escalating
interactions with people who are agitated, inebriated, belligerent, terrified, or who
are experiencing a mental health emergency.162 Many police training curricula teach
officers that policing is extremely dangerous to the officer and that the officer’s
single most important goal is to survive each shift.163 Such curricula train officers
to fear the people they are sworn to serve and protect, and leave them
underprepared to resolve difficult interpersonal encounters without resorting
to force.164

155. See infra notes 156–159, 175–176 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.220 (2020); IDAHO CODE § 19-5109(1)(a), (d) (2020);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 840(1)(b), (d) (McKinney 2020); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.12 (West 2020);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.609 (West 2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 181A.365(5)(e) (2020).
157. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, §§ 1005, 1011, 1051–84 (2021); N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 6025.3-.5 (2021).
158. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 11B-20.001 to 21.002 (2021); IDAHO CODE § 11.11.01.031
(2021); IOWA CODE §§ 501-4.1 to -4.4(80B) (2020).
159. See, e.g., MINN. R. 6700.1800 (2020).
160. POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., RE-ENGINEERING TRAINING ON POLICE USE OF FORCE
(2015), https://www.policeforum.org/assets/reengineeringtraining1.pdf [ https://perma.cc/4JY5-A2L3 ].
161. Rich Morin & Andrew Mercer, A Closer Look at Police Officers Who Have Fired Their
Weapon on Duty, PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/02/08/a-closer-look-at-police-officers-who-have-fired-their-weapon-on-duty/ [ https://
perma.cc/UQN6-L99D ].
162. POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., supra note 160.
163. Stoughton, supra note 30, at 639.
164. Seth Stoughton, a law professor and former police officer, reports that in the police
academy, “[o]fficers learn to treat every individual they interact with as an armed threat and every
situation as a deadly force encounter in the making . . . everyone is a threat until conclusively proven
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POST commissions can require both initial and in-service training that will
equip officers to resolve situations equitably and without unnecessary force. They
can, for example, require training on topics like de-escalation; crisis intervention;
procedural justice; bias-free policing; and interactions with vulnerable groups such
as people with limited English proficiency, people in mental health crisis, Deaf
people and others with disabilities, immigrants, and victims of sexual assault and
domestic violence. Many POST commissions already engage in this work: since
2014, several POST commissions have increased requirements for police training
on crisis intervention, de-escalation, and mental illness.165
POST commissions can also influence professional norms by implementing
training curricula and continuing training requirements that emphasize restraint,
de-escalation, and respect for human life, dignity, and privacy. POST commissions
can, for example, require that police academies train officers to exhaust other
alternatives before resorting to force—a higher bar than the minimum
constitutional standard that police force be “objectively reasonable” under
the circumstances.166
The professional norms communicated in POST training curricula can even
influence how courts interpret the scope of constitutional protections against
excessive force. While federal courts emphasize that police violation of an internal
policy or state law does not necessarily mean that any constitutional violation has
taken place,167 some courts permit evidence in civil rights cases that a defendant
violated standard professional practices.168 If all officers in a state are trained to
otherwise.” Seth Stoughton, Law Enforcement’s “Warrior Problem,” 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 225, 228
(2014–2015).
165. MARTHA PLOTKIN & TALIA PECKERMAN, COUNS. OF STATE GOV’TS JUST. CTR., THE
VARIABILITY IN LAW ENFORCEMENT STATE STANDARDS: A 42-STATE SURVEY ON MENTAL
HEALTH AND CRISIS DE-ESCALATION TRAINING 2–3 (2017), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/JC-LE-Survey.pdf [ https://perma.cc/VKK8-3QCE ]; Marshall Griffin,
New Training Standards for Missouri Law Officers Include De-Escalation Techniques, ST. LOUIS
PUB. RADIO (Dec. 1, 2015, 4:56 PM), https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/new-training-standardsmissouri-law-officers-include-de-escalation-techniques#stream/0 [ https://perma.cc/5BT5-3DM8 ];
David Hun, Nixon Directs Commission to Boost Police Officer Training, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
(Aug.
6,
2015),
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/nixon-directscommission-to-boost-police-officer-training/article_b33ca859-019e-5d2a-98d2-432e7510d54e.html
[ https://perma.cc/L4GL-QJYL ].
166. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
167. See, e.g., Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[T]here is no federal
constitutional liberty interest in having state officers follow state law or prison officials follow prison
regulations.”); Holland v. City of New York, 197 F. Supp. 3d 529, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Case v. Kitsap
Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 249 F.3d 921, 930 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]here is no § 1983 liability for violating
prison policy. [Plaintiff] must prove that [the official] violated his constitutional right . . . .”
(quoting Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997)); Gagne v. City of Galveston, 805 F.2d
558, 560 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[A]llegations about the breach of a . . . regulation are simply irrelevant to the
question of an official’s eligibility for qualified immunity in a suit over the deprivation of a
constitutional right.”).
168. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 772 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he plaintiff’s
proffered expert testimony that Brooks’ tactics violated standard police practices, while not
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follow a particular standard when using force or making an arrest, then a jury might
conclude that the “reasonable officer” who serves as the benchmark in Fourth
Amendment cases would also conform to that standard. Accordingly, a few courts
have explicitly considered POST standards in determining whether a law
enforcement officer used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment169
or whether a law enforcement executive was responsible for an unconstitutional
failure to train.170 Thus, POST regulation of police training could influence not only
police culture but potentially the judiciary’s view of use of force as well.
Finally, POST commissions can refuse to provide continuing education credit
or tuition reimbursement for training courses that promote overly aggressive,
“warrior” approaches to policing. Widespread police training programs like
“Bulletproof Warrior” and those offered by William Lewinski’s Force Science
Institute have received national criticism for promoting a fear-based approach to
police-community encounters and for teaching officers that they risk being
murdered if they hesitate to use deadly force.171 Minnesota officer Jeronimo Yanez
reportedly attended a Bulletproof Warrior training two years before he shot
Philando Castile at a traffic stop in 2016.172 Bad police training can also spread
dispositive, may also be deemed relevant to the reasonableness inquiry . . . .”); Jimenez v. City of
Chicago, 732 F.3d 710, 721 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that it was appropriate for police-practices expert to
“describ[e] sound professional standards and identify[ ] departures from them”); Restivo v. Hessemann,
846 F.3d 547, 580 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that district court properly admitted expert testimony on
“what minimally accepted police practices required and about his opinion that [the defendant’s] conduct
departed from accepted police practices”); Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 450 (3d Cir. 2017)
(“[O]fficials are expected to use the benefit of their expertise and professional training when
confronted with situations in which they are responsible for preventing harm to other individuals.”)
169. See, e.g., Young v. County of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 2011) (considering
evidence regarding California POST curriculum on pepper spray in assessing the reasonableness of
deputy’s use of pepper spray in Fourth Amendment case); Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 703
(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a reasonable jury could consider whether officer’s actions comported with
standards set by state POST board in assessing whether use of force was reasonable).
170. See Newsome v. Higham, No. 7:08-CV-8 (HL), 2010 WL 1258013, at *5
(M.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2010) (holding that a jury could find that a sheriff was liable for failure to train a
prison official who sexually assaulted a prisoner based on evidence that the sheriff allowed correctional
officer to work without completing minimum POST training); see also Brandon Garrett & Seth
Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211, 295 (2017).
171. Mitch Smith & Timothy Williams, Minnesota Police Officer’s ‘Bulletproof Warrior’ Training
is Questioned, N.Y. TIMES ( Jul. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/us/minnesotapolice-officers-bulletproof-warrior-training-is-questioned.html
[ https://perma.cc/HQ4B-DY3L ];
Radley Balko, Opinion, A Day with ‘Killology’ Police Trainer Dave Grossman, WASH. POST.: THE
WATCH (Feb. 14, 2017, 5:29 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/
02/14/a-day-with-killology-police-trainer-dave-grossman/ [ https://perma.cc/A4HZ-8XUA ] (“In the
class recorded for ‘Do Not Resist,’ Grossman at one point tells his students that the sex they have after
they kill another human being will be the best sex of their lives.”); Matt Apuzzo, Training Officers to
Shoot First, and He Will Answer Questions Later, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/us/training-officers-to-shoot-first-and-he-will-answer-questionslater.html [ https://perma.cc/NN9L-CZKT ].
172. Jennifer Bjorhus, Officer Who Shot Castile Attended ‘Bulletproof Warrior’ Training, STAR
TRIB. (Jul. 14, 2016, 10:27 AM), http://www.startribune.com/officer-in-castile-case-attended-
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dangerous misinformation and conspiracy theories. In October 2020, the
International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers Association promoted a
lengthy document that describes Black Lives Matter activists as terrorists plotting a
violent revolution to overthrow the U.S. government.173 The document further
alleged that Black Lives Matter and antifa activists have “trained, dedicated snipers”
stationed in certain cities and are fronts for Russia and China.174
In 2020, the Minnesota legislature prohibited its POST commission from
offering continuing education credit or reimbursement for “warrior-style training,”
which it defined as “training for peace officers that dehumanizes people or
encourages aggressive conduct by peace officers during encounters with others in
a manner that deemphasizes the value of human life or constitutional rights, the
result of which increases a peace officer’s likelihood or willingness to use deadly
force.”175 If a POST board decertifies a training course that promotes an overly
aggressive, fear-based approach to policing, officers will hesitate to enroll in it
because their tuition would not be reimbursed. Many POST commissions possess
broad authority to regulate and certify police instructors and training schools176 and
could decertify inappropriate training curricula even in the absence of
legislative action.
2. Model Policies and Minimum Policy “Floors”
POST commissions can also influence police standards and behavior by
adopting model policies or policy “floors” that limit police departments’ rulemaking
discretion and promote police accountability. While written law enforcement
policies are not a panacea, they establish a foundation for police
accountability: officers cannot be held accountable for violating a standard that was
never established.
In several states, POST commissions have the power to develop model

bulletproof-warrior-training/386717431/ [ https://perma.cc/CMH9-WJP7 ].
173. Ryan J. Foley, Police Guide That Calls BLM a Terrorist Group Draws Outrage, AP NEWS
(Dec. 2, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/police-guide-calls-blm-terrorist-group-8dc0afce2ce6b
60dbaa0d1d9c53ce1e3 [ https://perma.cc/DQ6N-D9EH ].
174. Id.
175. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.8434 (West 2021); see also Jennifer Bjorhus, State Police Licensing
Board Plans Response to Failings in Minnesota’s Rape Investigations, STAR TRIB. (July 27, 2018,
5:25 AM), https://www.startribune.com/minnesota-police-licensing-board-to-address-failings-inrape-investigations/489240711/ [https://perma.cc/SA92-Q6UP] (discussing Minnesota activists’
efforts to convince the POST board to decertify Bulletproof Warrior training courses).
176. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1822 (2020) (granting POST the power to prescribe
minimum standards for training facilities for law enforcement officers); 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/6
(West 2020) (“The Board shall select and certify schools within the State of Illinois for the purposes of
providing basic training . . . and of providing advanced or in-service training . . . which . . . may be either
publicly or privately owned and operated.”); DEL. CODE ANN. 11, §8404 (West 2019-2020) (granting
council the power to certify and decertify police instructors and police training schools); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 943.12(3) (West 2020) (same); GA. CODE ANN. §35-8-9(b) (West 2020) (same).
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policies or minimum policy standards on topics identified by state law.177 POST
commissions have adopted model policies addressing use of force,178 police
pursuits,179 sexual assault and domestic violence investigations,180 use of electronic
weapons,181 fair and impartial policing,182 nonenforcement of federal immigration

177. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13516, 13517, 13517.5, 13517.7 (West 2021); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 7-294o (West 2020); FLORIDA STAT. ANN. § 943.1701 (West 2020); 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/
7.5 (West 2020); MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY §3-207(e) (West 2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 6,
§ 116A(a) (West 2020); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.8454, 626.8457, 626.8458, 626.8471 (West 2021);
N.H. REV. STAT. Ann. § 106-L:5(XI) (2020); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 840(1)(j), (1)(k), (3)(f), (3)(f)(1), (3)(g),
(4)(a) (McKinney 2021); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 728-503-1 (LexisNexis 2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§§ 2366(a), 2402(b) (2021); Va. Code. Ann. § 9.1-102(37) (2021); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.101.226
(West 2020); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 165.85(4)(d)–(e)(1) (West 2020); see also S. No. 2963(d)(f), 191 Gen.
Ct. (Mass. 2020).
178. MODEL POL’Y: USE OF CONDUCTED ELEC. WEAPONS (CONN. POLICE OFFICER
STANDARDS
AND
TRAINING
COUNS.
2014),
https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/POST/
GENERAL_NOTICES/2014/GN1402USEOFELECTRONICWEAPONSPUBLICACT14149pdf.
pdf [ https://perma.cc/H39T-NLPZ ]; BD. OF TRS. MINIMUM STANDARDS: POL’Y 1 USE OF
PHYSICAL FORCE (ME. CRIM. JUST. ACAD. 2020), available at https://www.maine.gov/dps/mcja/
training/index.htm [ https://perma.cc/G83W-GVLC ], USE OF FORCE AND DEADLY FORCE MODEL
POL’Y
(MINN.
PEACE
OFFICER
STANDARDS
AND
TRAINING
B D.
2021),
https://dps.mn.gov/entity/post/model-policies-learning-objectives/Documents/pdf.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/LXV5-5JXR ].
179. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/7.5 (West 2020), Minn. Stat. Ann. § 626.8458 (West 2021), UTAH
ADMIN. CODE r. 728-503 (LexisNexis 2021); VA. CODE. ANN. § 9.1-102(37)(g) (2021); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 43.101.226 (West 2020); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 165.85(4)(d)–(e)(1) (West 2020); WIS.
ADMIN. CODE LES § 3.07 (2020); BD. OF TRS. MINIMUM STANDARDS: POL’Y 2 POLICE PURSUIT
POL’Y (ME. CRIM. JUST. ACAD. 2020), available at https://www.maine.gov/dps/mcja/training/
index.htm [ https://perma.cc/59GD-BFK6 ]; MODEL POL’Y: POLICE MOTOR VEHICLE PURSUIT
POL’Y (CONN. POLICE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING COUNS. 2014), https://portal.ct.gov
/-/media/POST/GENERAL_NOTICES/2019/19-04-Updated-Model-Pursuit-Policy.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/V77B-WBS8 ].
180. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13516, 13517, 13517.5, 13517.7 (West 2021); BD. OF TRS.
MINIMUM STANDARDS: POL’Y 3 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POL’Y (ME. CRIM. JUST. ACAD. 2020), available
at https://www.maine.gov/dps/mcja/training/index.htm [ https://perma.cc/5E89-8JKY ]; MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 116A(a) (West 2020), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.342 (West 2021); VA. CODE. ANN.
§ 9.1-102(37) (2021).
181. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-1t(b)(1) (West 2020) (“Each law enforcement agency that
authorizes a police officer employed by such agency to use an electronic defense weapon shall: (A) Not
later than January 31, 2015, adopt and maintain a written policy that meets or exceeds the model policy
developed by the Police Officer Standards and Training Council regarding the use of an electronic
defense weapon.”).
182. BD. OF TRS. MINIMUM STANDARDS: POL’Y 6 VIOLATIONS OF THE MAINE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT / HATE OR BIAS CRIMES POLICY (ME. CRIM. JUST. ACAD. 2020), https://www.maine.gov/dps/
mcja/training/index.htm [ https://perma.cc/8N3D-XTS4 ]; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.8471 (West
2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2366 (2021); VA. CODE. ANN. § 9.1-102(37) (2021).
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law,183 and procedures for investigating complaints against officers.184 While some
states’ POST model policies are nonbinding recommendations of best practices,185
others require police departments to enact POST-prescribed policies186 or set policy
floors that all law enforcement agencies within the state must meet or exceed.187
In many states, POST power to set policy floors is limited to specific topics
identified by the legislature.188 A few states confer broad authority on POST to set
minimum standards related to police use of force.189 Such power could, for example,
be used to enact statewide bans on the use of neck restraints or the firing of
munitions indiscriminately into crowds. State legislatures could empower POST to
regulate policing in the public interest by granting broad authority to set minimum
policy standards in key policy areas such as use of force, force investigations, crowd
management, equitable policing, sexual misconduct, and investigation of citizen
complaints. State legislatures should direct POST commissions to use their
policymaking authority to promote equity, reduce use of force, and protect the
public from police misconduct.
POST commissions’ policymaking power may also counterbalance the
growing influence of private companies over police policymaking. As Ingrid Eagly
and Joanna Schwartz have reported, over 3,000 law enforcement agencies in
thirty-five states contract with private police policymaking company Lexipol to
author their policy manuals.190 Over ninety-five percent of the law enforcement
agencies in California have Lexipol-created policies.191 Eagly and Schwartz note that
183. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2366 (2021) (“Agencies and constables may not adopt a policy
that allows for greater communication or involvement with federal immigration authorities than is
permitted under the [Criminal Justice Training Council’s] model policy [on fair and impartial
policing].”); MODEL FAIR & IMPARTIAL POLICING POL’Y (VT. CRIM. JUST. TRAINING COUNS. 2017),
https://vcjc.vermont.gov/sites/vcjtc/files/files/Fair%20and%20Impartial%20Policing%20Policy%2
012-7-2017.pdf [ https://perma.cc/YVX4-Q335 ].
184. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2366 (2021), ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT MODEL POLICY
(MINN. PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING BD. 2011), https://dps.mn.gov/entity/
post/model-policies-learning-objectives/Documents/Allegations-of-Misconduct-Model-Policy.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/NS8U-SQXW ].
185. See, e.g., WIS. ADMIN. CODE LES § 3.07 (2020) (setting advisory standards on police pursuit
driving techniques).
186. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.8457 (West 2021); (requiring law enforcement agencies
to adopt policies on unprofessional conduct that are identical or substantially similar to the model policy
adopted by the POST board).
187. See, e.g., tit. 20, § 2366; BD. OF TRS. MINIMUM STANDARDS: POL’YS 1–12 (ME. CRIM. JUST.
ACAD. 2020), https://www.maine.gov/dps/mcja/training/index.htm [ https://perma.cc/R6EDCHBD ]; An Act Concerning the Use of Electronic Defense Weapons by Police Officers, 2014 Conn.
Acts 14–149 (Reg. Sess.).
188. See, e.g., FLORIDA STAT. ANN. § 943.1701 (West 2020) (domestic violence); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 6, § 116A(a) (West 2020) (domestic and sexual violence); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§§ 2366–2368 (2021) (unbiased policing, electronic control weapons, and body-worn cameras).
189. See, e.g, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.8452 (West 2021); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25,
§ 2803-B (West 2020).
190. Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 30, at 891.
191. Id. at 893.
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while companies like Lexipol provide a valuable service to some small departments,
“reliance on this private entity to establish standards for public policing also raises
several concerns arising from its for-profit business model, focus on liability risk
management, and lack of transparency or democratic participation.”192 Lexipol has
urged law enforcement agencies to reject reforms suggested by leading law
enforcement industry groups like the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF),
cautioning departments not to adopt use-of-force policies more stringent than the
constitutional floor set in Graham v. Connor193 and objecting to PERF’s suggestion
that sanctity of life should be the central principle of every use-of-force policy.194
POST commissions can use their policy-setting power to ensure that law
enforcement agencies adopt rules that prioritize protection of the public over
protection of police departments against lawsuits.
C. Discipline and Decertify Dangerous Officers
Too often, officers who commit serious acts of violence or misconduct remain
employed by police departments or find new police work after being fired.195
Detroit police officer Gary Allen Steele fired a gun near his girlfriend’s head during

192. Id. at 891.
193. Bruce Praet, National Consensus Policy on Use of Force Should Not Trigger Changes To
Agency Polices, LEXIPOL ( Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/usecaution-when-changing-use-of-force-policy-language/ [ https://perma.cc/T38A-8X8B ] (“While
‘de-escalation’ has become the latest buzzword and is conceptually advisable, agencies must exercise
extreme caution when mandating action with the use of inflexible ‘shalls.’”).
194. Michael Ranalli, Priority of Life: Building a Better Model for PERF’s First Guiding Principle,
LEXIPOL ( June 8, 2016), https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/priority-life-building-bettermodel-perfs-first-guiding-principle-2/ [ https://perma.cc/2Y35-CC5A ].
195. Timothy Williams, Cast-Out Police Officers Are Often Hired in Other Cities, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/us/whereabouts-of-cast-out-police-officersother-cities-often-hire-them.html [https://perma.cc/G3PB-KNCX]; Courtney Teague, Senate Waters
Down Bill To Set Minimum Police Officer Standards, HONOLULU CIV. BEAT (Apr. 4, 2018), https://
www.civilbeat.org/2018/04/senate-waters-down-bill-to-set-minimum-police-officer-standards/
[ https://perma.cc/2K29-A2VG ]; Roger L. Goldman, Opinion, Rogue Cops Should Not Be Recycled
From One Police Department to the Next, GUARDIAN (May 20, 2015, 7:15 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/20/rogue-cops-should-not-be-recycled-from-onepolice-department-to-the-next [ https://perma.cc/6FXY-PCJ3 ]; Anthony Fisher, Why It’s So Hard to
Stop Bad Cops From Getting New Police Jobs, REASON (Sept. 30, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://
reason.com/2016/09/30/why-its-so-hard-to-stop-bad-cops-from-ge/ [ https://perma.cc/K6S5CJDK ]; Christopher N. Osher, Felony Guilty Plea Did Not End Colorado Cop’s Career; Havoc Followed,
DENVER POST (Dec. 12, 2015, 1:08 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2015/12/12/felony-guiltyplea-did-not-end-colorado-cops-career-havoc-followed/
[ https://perma.cc/VU8L-UZYM ];
Robert Faturechi & Ben Poston, Sheriff’s Department Hired Officers with Histories of Misconduct, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 1, 2013), https://graphics.latimes.com/behind-the-badge/ [ https://perma.cc/H2QHRFZJ ]; Kimbriell Kelly, Wesley Lowery & Steven Rich, Forced Out Over Sex, Drugs and Other
Infractions, Fired Officers Find Work in Other Departments, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/forced-out-over-sex-drugs-or-child-abuse-fired-officersfind-work-in-other-departments/2017/12/22/e0512774-d3a7-11e7-95bf-df7c19270879_story.html
[ https://perma.cc/27JP-3D3C ].
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an argument.196 After being charged with attempted murder, he pled guilty to
misdemeanor assault and was permitted to stay on the force.197 Officer Eddie Boyd
resigned from the St. Louis Police Department after striking two children in the
face with weapons without justification, only to be rehired by two other Missouri
police departments.198 Ethan Ferguson was fired from the Honolulu Police
Department after falsifying reports and lying to his supervisors about transporting
a minor girl, but went on to be hired at a new job as a state conservation officer,
where he sexually assaulted another teenage girl.199
POST commissions’ decertification power can prevent violent police officers
from harming more people when law enforcement agencies fail to act.200
Forty-seven states empower POST commissions to revoke an officer’s
certification, preventing the officer from working as a police officer anywhere
within the state.201 All POST agencies that have decertification authority can revoke
an officer’s certification if the officer is convicted of a felony, and forty-six states
can revoke certification based on certain misdemeanor convictions.202 Most states
also empower POST commissions to decertify officers who commit serious
misconduct on the job.203
196. Louise Radnofsky, Zusha Elinson, John R. Emshwiller & Gary Fields, Why Some Problem
Cops Don’t Lose Their Badges, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 30, 2016, 12:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
why-some-problem-cops-dont-lose-their-badges-1483115066 [ https://perma.cc/FCV3-RK35 ].
197. Id.
198. Williams, supra note 195.
199. Michael Martinez & Keith Allen, Hawaii Officer Charged with Sexual Assault of Girl While
on Duty, CNN ( Jan. 15, 2016, 8:50 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/15/us/hawaii-dlnr-officerethan-ferguson-charge-sexual-assault/index.html [ https://perma.cc/C3T4-4E5V ]; Nick Grube,
Woman Sues Hawaii for Hiring Ex-Cop Who Then Assaulted Her, HONOLULU CIV. BEAT
( Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.civilbeat.org/2018/01/woman-sues-hawaii-for-hiring-ex-cop-who-thenassaulted-her/ [ https://perma.cc/3727-LCK3 ].
200. See infra notes 201–203 and accompanying text.
201. The three states that lack decertification authority are California, Rhode Island, and New
Jersey. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13503(i) (West 2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-122 (West 2020); 42
R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28.2-10 (2020). California’s POST Commission previously held limited authority
to cancel officer certificates, but police unions successfully lobbied the state legislature to rescind the
commission’s decertification power in 2003. See Roger L. Goldman, Importance of State Laws in Police
Reform, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 363, 386 n.137 (2016).
202. See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 85.110(b)(1) (2021); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 81-1403(6) (West 2020); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.501 (West 2019). Ohio’s POST commission
has exceptionally limited decertification authority: the commission can revoke an officer’s license only
based on a felony conviction or guilty plea, or when an officer charged with a felony agrees to surrender
his certificate as part of a misdemeanor plea agreement. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 109.77(F),
2929.43(D) (West 2020).
203. See e.g. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R13-4-109(A)(8), (12) (2019) (authorizing decertification
when an officer commits “malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office”); S.C. CODE ANN.
REGS. R. 37-026 (2021) (requiring decertification when the Council is presented with satisfactory
evidence that an officer has committed misconduct as defined in applicable regulations); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 81-1403(6) (West 2020) (authorizing decertification for violation of POST rules); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12-63-04(4) (2019) (same); ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2806-A (West 2020) (authorizing
decertification for “gross deviations from the standard of conduct to which a reasonable officer would
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Most POST commissions, however, rarely use these powers. Two
states—Florida and Georgia—were responsible for more than half of the 1,847
certification revocations in 2015.204 Twelve states that had decertification power
either never used it that year or used it only once or twice.205 Even when officers
commit crimes or egregious misconduct, POST commissions do not consistently
decertify them. A 2015 Wall Street Journal report analyzed a database of 3,458 police
officers across the United States whose arrests between 2005 and 2011 resulted in
either convictions, job termination, or both. Four years later, 332 of these
officers—almost ten percent—were still working as police officers.206 A 2019
investigative report found that one out of five California officers convicted of a
crime over the past ten years kept their jobs for at least a year after conviction.207
There are many possible reasons why POST decertification power is currently
underutilized. First, as shown in Parts I and II, members of POST commissions are
unlikely to see police accountability as central to their mandate because neither the
state nor the commission directs them to use their powers to protect the public
against police misconduct. Additionally, in some states, the bar for decertification
is too high to be useful. In several states, for example, misconduct is not grounds
for decertification unless it results in a criminal conviction.208 Such limitations make
it extremely difficult for POST commissions to decertify officers who commit even
serious forms of misconduct. Some forms of police misconduct, such as sexual
harassment and racial profiling, may not be punishable as criminal offenses. Others,
such as excessive force, could theoretically be punished as criminal assault or
homicide, but such prosecutions are extremely rare.209 State legislatures could
bolster police accountability by ensuring that POST commissions discipline officers
for acts of violence or on-the-job misconduct regardless of whether that conduct
adhere”); ALASKA ADMIN CODE tit. 13, § 85.110(b)(1) (2021) (authorizing decertification if an officer
fails to maintain good moral character); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.1395(7) (West 2020) (same); c.f. COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. 24-31-305(2) (West 2021); 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/6.1(a), (e) (West 2020);
IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-1-12.5(a)(1) (West 2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.609 Sec. 9 (12) (West
2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 109.77(F), 2929.43(D) (West 2020); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.501(d)(1) (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1707(A)(ii)–(iv) (West 2020); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 53-6-211(1)(d) (West 2020).
204. HICKMAN, supra note 18.
205. Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. See id.
206. Radnofsky et al., supra note 196.
207. Robert Lewis & David DeBolt, Many California Cops Have Kept Their Jobs After Being
Convicted of a Crime, VOICE SAN DIEGO (Nov. 10, 2019), https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/
public-safety/many-california-cops-have-kept-their-jobs-after-being-convicted-of-a-crime/ [ https://
perma.cc/S6S2-U3H5 ].
208. See, e.g., 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/6.1 (West 2020); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-1-12.5
(West 2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.609 Sec. 9 (12) (West 2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§109.77(F) (West 2020); LA. ADMIN CODE. tit. 22, § 4731 (2021).
209. See Tom Jackman & Devlin Barrett, Charging Cops with Crimes is Still Difficult for
Prosecutors, WASH. POST (May 29, 2020, 4:25 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/
2020/05/29/charging-cops-with-crimes-is-still-difficult-prosecutors/ [ https://perma.cc/764F-WWLK ].
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leads to a criminal conviction.210
Moreover, most POST statutes confer broad discretion as to whether and
when to decertify, even in cases of severe misconduct. If an officer commits severe
misconduct, POST commissions in most states may decertify the officer, but
decertification is not compulsory unless the officer is convicted of a specified
crime.211 More states could choose to follow the example of states like Oregon,
which mandates decertification if an officer is terminated for corruption, false
testimony, falsification of evidence, brutality, sexual abuse, intimidation, or
deliberately obtaining a false confession.212
Even if they have power to decertify and want to use it, POST commissions
typically lack the investigative staff and institutional resources that would be
required to investigate and adjudicate decertification cases. Currently, POST
commissions delegate investigations to the law enforcement agency that employs
the officer, rather than investigating complaints independently.213 Self-investigation
is not sufficient to ensure accountability for police misconduct. Ineffective
accountability systems,214 inadequate supervision,215 and a culture of cover-up216
remain serious problems in many police departments. State legislatures should
ensure that POST commissions have adequate powers, staff, and resources to

210. Goldman & Puro (1987), supra note 33, at 74; Goldman & Puro (2001), supra note 33, at
553–55; Goldman (2003), supra note 33, at 122–23; Goldman (2012), supra note 33; Goldman, supra
note 201.
211. See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 13-4-109.01 (2020); MINN. R. 6700.1600 (2020); 12 N.C.
ADMIN. CODE 9A.0204(b)(2) (2020); RULES: CHAPTER 8 (WYO. PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND
TRAINING COMM’N 2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.101.105 (West 2020); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-7-13(A) (West 2020).
212. Or. Admin R. 259-008-300(2)(e) (2021); see also S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. R. 37-026(A)(4)
(2021) (requiring decertification of officers who are found to have committed misconduct as defined
in statute); S. 20-217, 72d Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2020) (requiring decertification of any officer
found civilly liable for excessive force or failure to intervene to prevent excessive force); S. 2963 ch. 6E,
§ 10, 191 Gen. Ct., (Mass. 2020) (requiring decertification when an officer has been terminated for
specified misconduct and all appeals of the termination have been completed).
213. See, e.g., POST BD. COMPLAINT PROCESS (MINN. PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND
TRAINING BD. last visited Apr. 7, 2021), https://dps.mn.gov/entity/post/contact/Documents/
POST%20Complaint%20process%202020%20web%20version.pdf [ https://perma.cc/5J8L-CJH8 ]
(“Investigations are not conducted by Board staff.”).
214. See, e.g., Stephen Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 545 (2019) (arguing
that police disciplinary appeals create significant barriers to internal accountability within
police departments).
215. See, e.g., Armacost, supra note 30, at 474; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S
PATTERN AND PRACTICE POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994-PRESENT, at 44–47 (2017) (discussing several
investigations revealing patterns of weak discipline and inadequate supervision); CARL B. KLOCKARS,
SANJA KUTNJAK IVKOVICH, WILLIAM E. HARVER & MARIA R. HABERFELD, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
NCJ 181465, THE MEASUREMENT OF POLICE INTEGRITY (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/181465.pdf [ https://perma.cc/92E6-57P8 ].
216. See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias and
Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 250–51 (1998); Stoughton,
supra note 30, at 661–62; KLOCKARS ET AL., supra note 215, at 6.
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investigate complaints of misconduct and take appropriate disciplinary
action217—even when police departments fail to do so.218
When the professional regulatory bodies of other professions have increased
resources for investigation, disciplinary actions have increased accordingly. For
example, in the 1980s, the California State Bar faced strong criticism that its
disciplinary system was slow, opaque, and ineffective.219 California overhauled state
bar disciplinary procedures and increased its resources for professional discipline.
In 1985, the California State Bar had a budget of $17.8 million, forty-four percent
of which was spent on attorney discipline. By 1992, the Bar’s budget had increased
to over $50 million, seventy-five percent of which was dedicated to professional
discipline processes.220 During that time frame, the number of attorneys disciplined
by the State Bar each year more than doubled.221
Finally, POST commissions might use their decertification powers more
frequently if POST commissions routinely received information about officer
terminations, discipline, and other potentially concerning incidents. State
legislatures could require law enforcement agencies to share officer disciplinary
records with POST or to notify POST whenever an officer is fired, resigns under
threat of termination, or is disciplined for excessive force, dishonesty, witness or
evidence tampering, perjury, or sexual assault.222 Agency disciplinary action should
not, however, be the only trigger for mandatory reporting. For many police
departments, union contracts and law enforcement officers’ bill of rights laws create
substantial obstacles to imposing discipline on officers who commit even serious
acts of misconduct.223 State legislatures could also require law enforcement agencies
to notify POST commissions when an officer is arrested or charged with a crime,
is found civilly liable for excessive force or misconduct, is involved in a shooting,
or is involved in any other encounter that results in serious injury or death. State
legislatures could also mandate that law enforcement agencies notify POST
217. In at least some states, including California, Oregon, and Mississippi, POST commissions
obtain funding through assessments and surcharges on criminal and traffic convictions. See About
POST, supra note 10 (“POST funding comes from the State Penalty Fund, which receives money from
penalty assessments on criminal and traffic fines.”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.300(2)(a) (West 2020);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-6-15 (2021). Funding obtained through assessments on criminal and traffic
convictions may not suffice to support a full staff of investigators. Moreover, this funding stream
necessarily entails a conflict of interest: training and regulation that reduces the number of arrests and
citations would reduce the commission’s funding. Funding through state general funds or licensing fees
for certified officers or trainers could eliminate these conflicts of interest and put POST commissions
in a better position to investigate citizen complaints and hold officers accountable for misconduct.
218. See supra notes 190–191 and accompanying text.
219. William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics of Self-Regulation in the
California State Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 485, 603–04 (1995).
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Rushin, supra note 29, at 1196–98; Fisk & Song Richardson, supra note 29, at
749–50.
222. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 105:19 (2020).
223. See, e.g., Rushhin, supra note 29; Fisk & Song Richardson, supra note 29.
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commissions when they receive a complaint that an officer has committed sexual
assault or tampered with evidence. Such information sharing could empower POST
commissions to investigate and intervene where the employing agency’s response
(or nonresponse) is insufficient.
CONCLUSION
POST commissions must do more than ensure that officers know how to
investigate crimes and use firearms. Their highest priority must be to protect the
public, as the governing bodies of other regulated professions do. POST
commissions could and should use their powers to ensure that the public is
protected not only against crime, but also against individual and institutional
decisions that result in misconduct, discrimination, or violence. For POST
commissions to fulfill this potential, we need structural change. POST commissions
must include meaningful representation of the communities that are most exposed
to burdensome policing, and they need a clear mandate to use their powers to
promote equity and protect the public. These changes could recreate POST
commissions as agents of change, empowered to promote equitable and
accountable public safety.
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